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Abstract 
 
Fast track land reform in Zimbabwe has caused a raging debate drawing a lot of attention 
to the re-distribution programme. The invasion of commercial farms had a bearing on 
agricultural production, food security, security of tenure, rule of law and respect for 
property rights. This thesis examines the implications of such a frayed land reform 
resulting in strained donor and government relations. The crux of the argument is that 
land reform is harmful and damaging when the rule of law is flouted, directly impacting 
on social and power relations at grassroots level. These strained relations result from a 
lack of commitment by government, external donors and white commercial farmers to 
correct land injustices from the colonial period and ineffective agencies of restraint. This 
thesis will test these perceptions and views basing on the experiences of the grassroots 
people. It will also attempt to test whether the land question in Zimbabwe has finally 
been resolved or there are still aspects to it that need attention, since land reform is often 
viewed in moral and political terms. Was poverty alleviation prioritized in fast track land 
reform by giving land to the landless poor; to help redress population imbalances or 
meant to reward those who struggled for liberation? The thesis attempts to answer the 
question of ‘equity’ or restructuring of access over production and ownership of land. It 
then questions the equity trump card as touted by the government. Did the government 
commit another injustice while trying to redress past injustices by overlooking the 
rightful claimants in favour of entrenching state power? This thesis contributes to the 
raging debate on fast track land reform in Zimbabwe, using the case study of UMguza 
resettlement scheme.  
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LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE FAST TRACK LAND REFORM 
PROGRAMME (FTLRP) IN UMGUZA RESETTLEMENT SCHEME IN 
ZIMBABWE 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction 
It can be argued that land apart from water is the most important resource for any society. 
This is because it constitutes an imperative need for its people, the most basic need for 
food which is the basis for survival of all human beings. It is in this context, therefore 
that any land redistribution is inevitably contentious and politically complex (Adams 
2001, Kinsey 1999, Moyo 2001). Land redistribution is contentious and politically 
complex because it affects people’s livelihoods and could be said to threaten their very 
existence (Lahiff 2003, Marongwe 2002 and Villiers 2003). Thus in these terms then, any 
land reform will be subject to contestations with politics, power relations and socio-
economic factors playing a part in who receives land, how much land and who gets 
deprived of their land. In this regard, any land reform process emerges as a high stakes 
game with stakeholders who have a lot of vested interests in the outcome. 
 
In a social context dominated by differential access to the state administration, concern 
abounds that the adjudication or registration process will be manipulated by the elite to 
their advantage. Experience with land registration and titling schemes has shown that 
well informed, powerful and educated individuals often compete successfully for land not 
registered in their own name, while the mass of the rural people are generally unaware of 
the new land provisions  or do not grasp the implications of registration (Platteau,1996). 
 It is often the ability to use both statutory and customary law that enables powerful 
individuals or groups to enhance their interests. Given the high politicisation of wealth 
allocation and the highly unequal chances of accessing strategic information or 
influencing bureaucratic and judiciary decision making; registration can be said to supply 
a mechanism for transfer of wealth in favour of the educated, economic and political elite 
(Kinsey 1999, Marongwe 2002). Land titling opens up new possibilities of conflict and 
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insecurity as it encourages the assertion of greedy interests with powerful backing and 
rewards the cunning. This evolution can have disastrous consequences for vulnerable 
sections of the population if loss of land is followed by outright eviction (Platteau, 1996). 
 
Opposition from landowners and other interests can stall the process or result in 
excessively high compensation costs. Success requires long-term commitment and strong 
political management; but where governments, landowners and peasant farmers have 
remained divided, land has continued to be a source of conflict, as in Brazil and Southern 
Africa (Bernstein 2002, Cousins 2004 and Van der Brink 2002). In these countries, 
reform programmes have been only partially successful. Difficulties are greatest where 
there are demands for restoration of land rights alienated in the past or where land has 
become part of a wider struggle over social inequality (Kinsey 1999, Lahiff 2003, Palmer 
1990). Failure to address such powerful political motivations effectively can derail 
processes of land reform and economic development. In the worst case scenario, such 
pressures can lead to overzealous land reforms which undermine livelihoods creating 
conflict as with Zimbabwe’s ‘fast track’ land reform programme (Walt 1999:11).  
 
So much can be written about the land reform process in Zimbabwe, but this mini-thesis 
will limit its focus to the last phase of the reform process; commonly referred to as ‘fast 
track’. This will be done through an expose` of the process with the major focus being the 
local perceptions of fast track resettlement. Such focus is informed by a case study of 
Umguza, a peri-urban settlement just outside Bulawayo, located in Matabeleland North in 
Zimbabwe. At this juncture, it is important to note the point raised by Marongwe 
(2004:223) that:  
 
 …most land occupations took place in commercial farming areas in 
predominantly rural areas close to communal areas, there was also steady 
movement into and occupation of various forms of urban and peri-urban 
areas as the landless urban people also took the opportunity and 
exploited the chaotic situation created by farm occupations countrywide  
 
Umguza resettlement area falls into this latter category of a peri-urban area were fast 
track land resettlement occurred. Even the state itself had acknowledged the importance 
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of peri-urban settlement in the country’s land reform process through gazetting the 
‘Inception Phase Framework Plan’ as part of its land policy (GOZ 1998:27). One of its 
stated objectives was to manage peri-urban areas as zones of transition, maximizing the 
benefits or advantages of positive elements of both town and country. This rural-urban 
nexus thus presents an important area for policy analysis and research with regards to the 
dynamics of development in both urban and peri-urban areas (Marongwe 2004). It is 
some of these dynamics that the study of Umguza aims to replicate. Dynamics like tenure 
security, criteria of land allocation, infrastructure development, support services and 
quality of life among other issues. Through this, an attempt will then be made to assess 
the fast track land reform programme basing on data gathered from this study.  
 
Following on from the above paragraph, a word of caution ought to be sounded that; ‘the 
full impact of resettlement can only be assessed over a relatively long time horizon…. in 
a generation’ (Kinsey 1999:27). Despite this assertion by Kinsey, this mini-thesis will 
attempt a preliminary assessment based on the perceptions of local actors around Umguza 
on the benefits of the programme on their livelihoods. To put fast track into context, the 
mini thesis will discuss some moot or major points of post-colonial land reform in 
Zimbabwe. To do this effectively, only a limited review of the literature over the period 
will be undertaken, unlike the extensive coverage that has been done elsewhere by 
Kinsey (1999), Palmer (1990), Moyo (2001), Sachikonye (2002) among many others, but 
it will nonetheless refer to the period for contextual purposes. 
 
1.2 Definition of terms 
Before settling into the main discussion, a description of terms is necessary at this point. 
Land reform is generally understood to mean restitution, redistribution and or 
confirmation of rights in land to the benefits of the poor and dispossessed (Villiers 
2003:1; Adams 2001:1). Similarly, Griffin et al (2002:280) refers to land reform as a 
programme to redistribute land ownership from large private land owners to small 
peasant farmers and landless agricultural workers making it a redistribution of wealth. On 
the other hand, land tenure reform is ‘a planned change in terms and conditions on which 
land is held, used and transacted…can include confirmation of rights in order to verify 
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and secure sound land titles for those who have already a demonstrable claim to that 
land’ (Adams 2001:1). Emerging from these definitions is the issue of social justice, a 
means of righting a wrong in society by interventions in aid of the powerless and 
helpless. This would entail giving such land to those in most need of it such as women, 
young people and the displaced or overcrowded in communal areas. It has been claimed 
that land reform’s major goal has been the restructuring of access and ownership of land 
resource and agricultural production relations for the purpose of correcting historical 
injustices (GOZ, 2000). One is then left with the question, was all fast track land reform 
emanating from a strong belief in social justice? The findings in the study will put the 
above into perspective based on the observations that will emerge.   
 
Restitution, as a means of land reform entails ‘a limited process with a limited lifespan, 
aimed at specific parcels of land to specific people from whom it had been taken in terms 
of racially discriminatory laws or practices’ (Walt 1999:5). In contrast to restitution, 
redistribution of land ‘is a wider project aimed at rectifying (some of) the inequalities in 
current land redistribution patterns.’ It is ‘aimed mostly at those who did not have land 
before and still do not have (sufficient) land’ (Walt 1999: 6).These definitions still project 
that social justice issue, an element reminiscent and which can be linked or associated 
with other programmes in different parts of the world namely South Africa, Kenya, 
Namibia, Brazil, Bolivia and China to name just a few (Van der Brink 2002). Despite 
these associations, there are terms peculiar and unique to the Zimbabwean situation. 
Among these would be ‘fast track’ and ‘resettlement’.  
 
To begin explaining these terms, one could start with a dictionary definition of their 
import. The Oxford English dictionary defines fast track as the practice of making use of 
a process which is accelerated in comparison to the one in typical use in other words ‘the 
quickest and most direct route to the achievement of a goal’. Resettlement is defined as 
the ‘act of settling again’ or the ‘state of being settled again.’ in some way, resettlement is 
the final step in the process of land distribution. It takes place after an applicant has 
successfully taken a number of steps that have determined his/her eligibility. This will 
then lead to the applicant being finally allocated his/her area as a result of random 
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selection among other successful applicants or a negotiation with the former owner of the 
land or the relevant government institution (UNDP 2002).  
 
The above definitions offer interesting insights when juxtaposed with the Utete (2002:18) 
report which claims that: 
 
 “Fast track was designed to be undertaken in an accelerated manner and with reliance on 
domestic resources. It was a fundamental departure from previous philosophy, practices 
and procedures of acquiring land and resettling people. Fast track sped up the 
identification for compulsory land acquisition for resettlement of not less than 5million 
hectares of land. It accelerated the planning and demarcation of acquired land and settler 
placement on this land and the provision of limited basic infrastructure and farmer 
support services.” 
 
The above shows the rapidity and speed with which this programme was implemented 
which could have invited the wrath of critics because of the seemingly haphazard manner 
in which this whole exercise was carried out. At what cost then were these goals achieved 
in settlements of landless black Zimbabweans? This then is what the mini-thesis will 
attempt to answer through the respondents perceptions of the programme. 
 
1.3 Background 
A brief history is provided in order to situate the dynamics underlying Zimbabwe’s 
current land reform. In 1980, when Zimbabwe attained its independence from its former 
colonial rulers; land distribution was highly skewed in favour of white farmers. Large 
scale commercial farmers consisting of less than one percent of the population owned 
forty five percent of the agricultural land. More than half of these farms were located in 
parts of the country with high rainfall where the potential for agricultural production was 
high (UNDP 2002). Thirty five percent of the large scale commercial farming land was 
unutilized or under-utilised and yet indigenous populations were located in marginal 
lands in the low potential agricultural zones (UNDP 2002). 
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A dualistic system existed in the pattern of land ownership and tenure, as was common 
among African countries that were former colonies or had white administration such as 
Kenya and South Africa (van der Brink 2002). Through this, the largely black indigenous 
population were confined to the less fertile and marginal, unproductive areas in 
communal areas, while the white farmers had the most favourable regions in high rainfall 
areas with very rich soils and highly productive in terms of agricultural potential (UNDP 
2002, Utete 2002). It needs to be pointed out here that Zimbabwe’s agricultural land 
(close to 32.2 million hectares of it) is divided into V (five regions) or natural ecological 
zones. Natural regions I, II and III (about 12,6million hectares) are more suitable for 
agricultural production as they have rich soils, high rainfall and lush vegetation in 
abundance. In contrast, natural regions IV and V (which includes around 19.6 million 
hectares) have low rainfall, scant vegetation with soil properties having low inherent 
fertility (UNDP 2002).Although, very slight variations can be discerned from these broad 
categories, the study area Umguza falls under the latter regions. 
 
Despite this, thirty five percent of this fertile land in large scale commercial areas was 
either unused or under-utilised (Mbaya 2001; UNDP 2002). Such a situation was highly 
unjust and could not be tolerated forever. Therefore, it is not surprising that when 
Zimbabwe attained its independence; the government had to be seen to be restoring the 
land rights of the majority of the population, who are black people, by redressing the 
colonial injustices of the past through land redistribution.  
 
An examination of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme post 1980 can be categorised 
into three different time phases, each with distinct features associated with it. Beginning 
with the period 1980-1990, the phase after the Lancaster House agreement; the process 
was ‘market-driven’ through a ‘willing seller-willing buyer system’ with the objective 
being to redistribute land in an equitable yet transformative way that would not disrupt 
commercial farming (Kinsey 1999, Lahiff 2005). During this period, most of the land that 
was redistributed was marginal and under-used land (Utete 2002). 48 000 families were 
resettled by 1989 in Regions III and IV mostly under Model A, the villagised (people 
were resettled into organised, orderly villages) variant of the four resettlement models. 
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This figure (48 000 families) represents thirty percent of the envisaged total of 162 000 
families that had been set as a resettlement target in 1980 (Chitsike 2003, Sachikonye 
2002).  There were other models too, such as Model B, C and D which were designed to 
suit the different agro-ecological regions of the country. Briefly, Model D was applied in 
Natural Regions IV and V, the drier areas of the country suitable for livestock ranching. 
Model C for specialised crop farming of sugar, tea or tobacco was applied in a variety of 
Natural Regions. Lastly, Model B, that of cooperative farming proved unsuccessful early 
on and was abandoned in the 1990s (Rowntree 2006). It is important to note that in this 
period, donor funds were made available to assist the reform process. 
 
The first phase of land redistribution was followed by the period 1990- late 1999 which 
saw some economic decline and recurrent drought. A characteristic of this period was the 
issuing of 99 year leases which were meant to be an improvement from the permits of 
Phase I which were seen as insecure and providing no protection to settlers (UNDP 
2002). Coupled with this was the reduction of donor funds linked to the increased 
allegations of nepotism in land allocation. During this period, real distribution was seen 
to be well below target leading to increased farm invasions and occupations (Kinsey 
1999; Marongwe 2004). Compared to the targeted number of 91 000 families to be 
settled on 5million hectares; only 4 697 families were settled in 145 000 hectares (UNDP 
2002). The number of families settled fell far short of the intended target and also of the 
earlier objectives of the whole process, when Zimbabwean government’s objectives are 
taken into context which among others included the following: 
 
a) Reducing the extent and intensity of rural poverty among rural families and farm 
workers through provision of adequate land for agricultural production. 
b) Reducing population pressure in communal areas. 
c) Developing and integrating small-scale farmers into the mainstream of 
commercial agriculture. 
d) Creating conditions for sustainable economic, political and social stability.(UNDP 
2002:12) 
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 The third phase is the land invasions and occupations that began in 2000 to the time of 
writing. This was a ‘radical’ redistribution of land characterized by ‘a general absence of 
a clear and sustainable land reform policy’ (Villiers 2003:22). With the government 
legalising expropriation, the international community in retaliation froze the flow of 
international aid to Zimbabwe. In response to this the government tacitly and sometimes 
in not so subtle ways encouraged land invasions through the statements and actions of 
politicians, state agents and individuals well connected to the ruling party. 
 
 The above briefly summarises the land reform process in Zimbabwe by examining the 
phases which characterised the process during its twenty five years of independence. This 
will assist in situating the ‘fast track’ land reform as the last phase of reform.  
 
1.4 Research objectives 
Basing on the objective of the study, the overall aim is to outline the perceptions of 
various stakeholders in relation to fast track resettlement in the Umguza area. This will be 
done with the following specific objectives in mind: 
• To describe how land reform has shaped the livelihoods of stakeholders 
(beneficiaries and non beneficiaries); 
• To identify the opportunities and constraints found in Umguza resettlement 
scheme; 
• To identify current governance practices towards fast track resettlement in terms 
of tenure system, technical support, infrastructure and capital; 
• To investigate the socio-economic and political factors affecting the land reform 
programme in relation to restructuring of access and ownership of land as a 
resource for empowerment and agricultural production; 
• To draw attention to policy implications of the research findings. 
 
1.5 Key Research questions 
The following are the main research questions that guided the study: 
• How much land was transferred to beneficiaries in the Umguza area? 
• What is the demographic composition of beneficiaries of fast track land reform in 
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Umguza resettlement scheme? 
• What social, political and economic relations govern recipients’ access to land? 
• What are the challenges, opportunities and constraints of fast track land reform to 
rural development? 
• What are the perceptions of different stakeholders with regards to Umguza fast 
track resettlement scheme? 
• What are the wider policy implications of the research findings on Umguza fast 
track resettlement? 
  
1.6 Research methodology 
As an empirical study, qualitative methods were largely relied on, with some quantitative 
methods being used where necessary as in statistics on assets and livelihoods and socio- 
economic differences for case study households. The study used qualitative in-depth 
interviews to overcome the complexity of the research variables to make the study 
researchable. An actor-oriented approach was adopted which helped to provide a 
conceptual framework for understanding processes by which social arrangements emerge 
and are consolidated, conveying the idea of contested arenas, acknowledging multiple 
‘social realities’(Long 2002:71). The theory provided a more open-ended way of looking 
at interventions, scenarios and inter- locking arenas pertinent to development, which is 
the social process not merely the structural outcomes (Long 2002:72). In a longer study 
with more resources and time this approach could be used solely and relied on as it 
allows for knowledge and insight generation from the social actors involved in the land 
reform process, but here it was used as a guide or parameter with which to examine the 
processes under study. 
 
To complement the above, semi structured interviews were conducted with key 
informants like the district administrator, local councillor and traditional authority figures 
in the resettlement and surrounding area. Literature was also reviewed as secondary 
material (journals, research articles, books and government publications) to offer 
comparatives of similar studies conducted elsewhere. Participant observation was 
conducted to create a social map of the area by outlining the spheres of influence. 
 
 
 
 
 10
Participant observation allowed the presence of an observing and thinking researcher on 
the scene of the action who noted the empirical observations and made interpretations 
thereof. The research used the triangulation approach. Triangulation is the use of multiple 
methods in the same study to enhance validity and reliability in qualitative research 
(Babbie and Mouton 1998: 275,293-4). 
 
1.7 Rationale of the study 
Over the last few years, much has been written about Zimbabwe’s land reform especially 
the ‘fast track’ resettlement model. However, most of the material has focused on the 
northern and eastern parts of the country favoured with a better climate, soils, and better 
crop production prospects. These are also home to some well known game parks and very 
lucrative conservancies. Authors like Chaumba et al (2003), Lahiff (2003), Marongwe 
(2001), Moyo (1999, 2000, and 2001), Rutherford (2001), Sachikonye (2002) and 
Scoones and Woolmer (2002) among others have all contributed to an appreciation of 
fast track land reform in the northern and eastern part of the country. Where mention is 
made of Matabeleland, it is only in passing. Despite this, other studies focusing on 
Matabeleland cannot be ignored like Jocelyn Alexander’s (2001) analysis of the elections 
aftermath and the consequences thereof on land reform. This mini thesis is intended as a 
small way to contribute to literature with a deliberate focus on Matabeleland North and 
Umguza in particular. The research focus aimed to investigate the socio-economic and 
political factors affecting fast track land reform programme and the perceptions thereof of 
the people in this region. Questions were asked on their views and opinions both as 
participants in the exercise and as concerned observers.  
 
 Fast track land reform has been viewed as being chaotic and a disaster; hence this 
particular attempt to analyse the politics behind land distribution, the dynamics and 
outcomes of such policies especially with regard to Matabeleland. This then is what the 
research will interrogate. The reason behind the adoption of a capitalist mode of 
production although applying a socialist framework? At stake here is the issue of 
redistribution of large tracts of land to black individuals amidst the claim of righting 
some past injustices. The study will interrogate whether these injustices have been 
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righted as far as the people of Matabeleland are concerned or not? It will examine 
whether redistribution was just another case of history repeating itself with regards to 
marginalization of heirs to the land? Through interviews with key informants, the 
answers to these questions might emerge. At this juncture, the perceived marginalisation 
of the people in this region because of their long-standing political affiliation ought to be 
taken into context, thus a profile of beneficiaries may go a long way into explaining a few 
pertinent issues. Since independence, people in this part of the country have consistently 
voted against the ruling party, a trend which has seemingly continued even after the two 
major parties (ZANU PF and PF ZAPU) merged after the unity accord. With the 
emergence of the MDC, Matabeleland has remained one of the opposition strongholds, an 
indication of disgruntlement with the ruling party. 
 
1.8 Significance of the research 
This study aims to provide further understanding and appreciation of fast track land 
acquisition in Zimbabwe and in Matabeleland in particular. Alexander and McGregor 
(2001:514) describe Matabeleland occupations as being less violent and attracting a 
smaller communal constituency which they attribute to the attitude taken by the war 
veterans. Where violence occurred, it was associated with war veterans brought in from 
other parts of the region. They make the point though, that in this area there was no 
historical claim from people who were forcibly removed. The authors describe a mix of 
motives for the large scale occupations in Matabeleland that includes ‘more fertile and 
well watered soils than those in the neighbouring communal areas’. I will argue that this 
compares favourably when one contrasts Tsholotsho communal lands, a dry arid area, 
with Umguza which lies along the Zambezi water aquifer. This then makes the choice 
land reform or redistribution for Umguza as a case study. In addition to the above, it has 
to be borne in mind that not everyone has equal access to all production options. 
Therefore, agricultural and animal husbandry options are mediated by structures of social 
difference and power relations as well as economic, demographic and ecological 
parameters. Opportunities and constraints for differing farming strategies or the perceived 
opportunities and constraints depend on farmer’s wealth, gender, age, class and ethnicity 
(Scoones 2002). By interrogating the differing perceptions of the respondents, it is hoped 
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that answers to the issues raised will be revealed. 
 
It has been noted that land occupations heralded an era of opportunity for those who were 
enterprising enough and willing to take their chances. Access to substantial plots, 
especially under the A2 model, relations of patronage and a host of other non- 
agricultural opportunities like shebeens (illegal liquor outlets) and protection rackets are 
mentioned in other studies of fast track land reform (Chaumba et al 2003:10) Hence this 
research will examine who the beneficiaries are and their perceptions of fast track land 
reform. Stemming from the political dynamics referred to above, other stakeholders 
besides the beneficiaries will be given voice to air their views to cross check issues of 
empowerment or marginalization of the local populace (indigenous Matabeleland 
people). This will help to inform academics and the world at large of the dynamics 
involved, shedding some light on the question of integration and development in 
Zimbabwe. In this way, it will contribute towards ‘a more permanent arrangement to 
learn continually from people and involve them in reforming the land tenure system’ 
(Rukuni1999:27) for government, policy makers, researchers, donors and other 
stakeholders. 
 
Lessons derived from this mini thesis might help policy makers to plan programmes in 
future in Zimbabwe and elsewhere allowing for a review of institutional arrangements. 
This study could help determine the de-facto and de-jure rights of access of beneficiaries 
through gathering information about their perceptions and perspectives. This review 
essentially seeks an understanding of interventions as interpreted and implemented within 
specific socio- economic, cultural and political contexts in Zimbabwe. 
 
Worthy of note is the fact that Umguza resettlement area lies along an aquifer (water belt) 
that provides a green belt for agriculture. A lot of Bulawayo (Zimbabwe’s second city) 
market gardening needs have been supplied by farmers in this area. With the proposed 
Matabeleland Zambezi water project, this area stands directly in line to benefit, becoming 
a perennial haven for agricultural wealth. Its strategic location makes it a prime target for 
those eyeing the lucrative possibilities offered by this area marking it as a potential area 
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for conflict. Any of the A1 or A2 farmers in this area could have had this in mind when 
they settled on this land. It would be interesting then to explore the links between land 
rights, social rights and historical territorial rights and the implications of such rights for 
development in resettlement areas. 
 
1.9 Ethics statement 
The basic tenets upon which the study was premised demands a researcher who will be 
aware of the potentially sensitive nature of the information. To achieve this, ethical 
research practices recommended by Babbie and Mouton (2001) were followed. Prior to 
the research taking place, permission had to be sought to conduct the interviews from the 
authorities concerned. The administrative influence of former university colleagues who 
now worked in the civil service was used to gain access to the study field, with the 
relevant authorities approached to grant the necessary permission. Letters were written to 
the individuals involved, while permission was sought from the interviewees concerned. 
An explanation of the purpose of the interviews was made clear before the interviews. 
From then on, the respondents’ informed consent was sought prior to the interviews. 
Informed consent implies that ‘adequate information on the goal of the investigation, its 
procedures, the credibility of the research and the possible dangers to which the 
respondents may be exposed be rendered to potential subjects’ (Williams et al 1995:30). 
Thus informed consent meant giving an explanation of the purpose of the research; that, 
it was for academic purposes only and the respondents’ right to decline or accept taking 
part in the research would be respected.  
 
To counter this fear from the respondents, their identity was protected by maintaining 
confidentiality throughout the research process and in writing the thesis. Confidentiality 
of respondents was respected following applied regulations and ethics of research. 
Secondly, informed consent was gained from both local authorities and the respondents 
to conduct the research. Informed consent would include giving an explanation of the 
purpose of the research, that it was for academic purposes only and that the respondents’ 
right to decline or accept taking part in the research would be respected. To support this, 
their identity was protected through maintaining confidentiality throughout the research 
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process and in writing the thesis. Therefore, all the persons interviewed did so freely, 
knowing that the information they gave was for academic purposes. In this regard, 
‘informed consent becomes a necessary condition rather than a luxury or an impediment’ 
(Hakim 2000:143). The real names of interviewees were not used to preserve anonymity 
and protect the individuals’ privacy.  
 
1.10 Thesis Structure 
 
Chapter One 
 
In this chapter the study has been introduced together with a brief overview of the land 
reform process in general showing the three different stages that characterized 
Zimbabwe’s land reform. The chapter also explored briefly the dualistic nature of land 
tenure. This was done by showing the unequal distribution of land between the white 
commercial farmers and the rest of the African population in Zimbabwe soon after 
independence right up to the period of fast track land reform. Key words and terms that 
are particular to the case study and that occur frequently in the study will be defined to 
help the reader put them in perspective. Following that will be a look at the research 
objectives with the key questions being laid out. The research methodology, rationale and 
significance of the research will be briefly put into context in this chapter. Lastly, the 
chapter provided a look at the ethics statement that guided the study. 
 
Chapter Two 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide background to fast track land reform. To 
do this, contextualisation of land reform in Zimbabwe will be undertaken featuring the 
historical, political, economic and social factors affecting the process leading up to fast 
track land reform. A brief discussion of the history of land reform in Zimbabwe, the 
different phases and time zones will be undertaken. To do this, there was a focus on 
factors that slowed the pace of earlier land reforms in Zimbabwe, the reasons for fast 
track land reform with emphasis placed on the turning points. Among the contributory 
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factors to be mentioned will be the economic, social, political and legal environment that 
was prevailing at the time. A look at the regional and international dimensions will also 
be done to try and see where Zimbabwe’s experience measures up with the rest of the 
world.  This chapter will also review some other studies done on Zimbabwe’s fast track 
land reform and the insights that can be drawn from them. 
 
Chapter Three 
 
In this section, an explanation of the methodology used in the research will be provided. 
This will be done by providing a detailed presentation of the techniques used in the study. 
Following up on this will be a discussion of the data analysis that was done. Included in 
this chapter are the limitations of the study and a discussion of the ethical issues 
surrounding the study. The rest of the chapter focuses on the case study details including 
the setting of the settlers. To be tackled here will be a brief description of the resettlement 
area and the settlers themselves. 
 
Chapter Four 
 
This chapter places its focus on the research findings surrounding local perceptions of 
fast track. The findings are guided by the research questions around each of the main 
objectives of the study with the questions that were asked being discussed in sub-
sections. To be dealt with are the issues of perceptions from the stakeholders of Umguza 
resettlement scheme. Among the issues to be discussed will be the following; a profile of 
the beneficiaries who they are and where they come from, their education level, the 
gender and age factors which are important in any discussion of the viability of land 
reform. Linked to this will be a discussion of the size of households, their economic 
profile and the livelihood strategies that they have adopted to survive in the prevailing 
deteriorating macro-economic environment that Zimbabwe has had to contend with 
especially after Fast-track land reform.  The respondents’ fears, opinions, issues of tenure 
and how their livelihoods have been affected will be discussed including an examination 
of the beneficiary selection process.  
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Chapter Five 
 
In order to bring out some conclusions to the study some questions are raised in relation 
to what different stakeholders are saying and the direction which Fast Track Land reform 
will take. Some recommendations are also suggested regarding the future settlements. At 
the same time some conceptual issues raised earlier are returned to. It will also give an 
indication of the direction/s to take plus the student’s own views on the topic. It provides 
a summary of the mini thesis together with recommendations for policy makers on the 
way forward for future developments on resettlement. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, the background of fast track land reform in Zimbabwe will be explored 
and explained. This will be done through looking at the historical context from the period 
of the struggle for independence with land as a major push factor which led up to the 
taking of arms. The failure to address this injustice in land allocation/distribution even 
after independence will be examined together with the consequences of such failure. 
Other factors will also be explored, factors like the economic, political and the prevailing 
conditions at the time that contributed to fast track land reform becoming a reality in 
Zimbabwe. In addition, this chapter will also examine theory very briefly to try and put 
fast track land reform in a conceptual framework. 
 
2.1 The context of land reform in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is seen as an exceptional case in Southern Africa by having put a ‘radical’ 
land reform programme back on the political agenda (Lahiff 2003:3). Malawi, Namibia 
and South Africa as countries in Southern Africa, share a history of colonial occupation 
that has resulted in racially skewed land distribution systems, dual tenure systems, and 
severe degradation of communal areas as Zimbabwe (Hall 2003, Saruchera 2004). 
Worthy of note is the fact that these countries’ land reforms have not been as ‘radical’ 
and violent as the latter.  
 
Land has long been a contested issue in Zimbabwe dating back to the 1890’s with the 
arrival of white settlers who successfully pushed off indigenous people off large tracts of 
prime land to pursue agriculture. Land then was one of the major driving forces behind 
the liberation war in the 1960’s and 1970’s (Marinda 2006, Moyo 1995).It was the 
rallying cry of the liberation movements as understood in the terms of ‘umntwana 
wenhlabathi’ (Ndebele for ‘son of the soil’) which is associated with the form of greeting 
used by ZIPRA (the armed wing of PF Zapu) cadres. Similarly, ‘mwana wevhu’ (Shona 
for ‘child of the soil’) a slogan associated with the Shona; was a familiar refrain during 
public meetings and political rallies (Utete 2002). From the above, it becomes apparent 
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that a lot of expectations stemming, from the post war period therefore hinged around the 
land issue (SAFIRE 2004:1). This echoes the refrain or phrase common to other countries 
that have waged wars of liberation like Kenya and Nigeria whose literature reverberates 
with “a son of the soil”(Ngugi Wa Thi’ongo) depicting a close link or attachment and 
connection to the land. It is in reference to these expectations that fast track land reform 
was justified in some sections of government and landless masses of Zimbabwean society 
as will emerge in this study. 
 
 At independence in 1980, a land reform programme was immediately set in motion 
amidst rather stringent conditions set out in the Lancaster House agreement of 1979 
which included adherence to the ‘willing buyer and willing seller’ condition (SAFIRE 
2004:1; Moyo 2001:317;Palmer 1990:168).There was some significant progress in the 
resettlement programme during the first few years after independence. By 1990, 52 000 
families had been resettled with 3 million hectares having been acquired; that is, 16% of 
land formerly held by white commercial farmers (de Villiers 2003:10). Productivity was 
increased on these farms since they had largely been unutilised. Agricultural support 
through government extension services mostly benefited the small elite group of ‘master 
farmers’ (Rowntree 2006). Overall, the whole programme is generally viewed as having 
failed to meet its targets during the first decade after independence (Palmer 1990, Kinsey 
1984, 1995 and Moyo 1999). In general terms, this can be viewed as being a failure on 
the part of government to reach its goal and objective in resettlement numbers and de-
congesting crowded communal areas. 
 
2.2 Factors slowing the pace of reform 
A number of explanations or reasons could be put forward explaining the slow pace of 
land reform in the first decade of Zimbabwe’s independence. This first phase of land 
reform soon after independence was market driven by the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ 
process with adequate compensation going to the farmers who were willing to sell off 
their land to government (de Villiers 2003:16).Critically important at this stage to 
mention is that this concept of ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ had its basis rooted in the 
Lancaster House agreement of 1979 (Kinsey 1984, Moyo 1995). These were conditions 
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insisted upon by World Bank policies of encouraging ‘free markets’ were prices were 
determined by the markets. Productive land in the hands of white farmers could only be 
acquired if the state was willing to pay a ‘market price’. The state was not obliged to 
purchase any property that was offered but was granted first refusal on all land sales. The 
landless (the intended beneficiaries) were not directly involved in the transaction thus 
could not constitute a ‘willing buyer’- a role reserved for the state alone (Lahiff 2005:1). 
It is important at this stage to mention that the reform process guaranteed property rights 
even for those lands which were under-utilised (de Villiers 2003:9). Therefore the 
process was skewed in favour of land owners. Compounding the issue was the high cost 
of land resulting from political and economic stability leading to price stabilization and 
hence increases in land prices (Kinsey 1999). 
 
On the other hand, bilateral agreements with Britain requiring government to match 
donor funding could not sustain the land acquisition programme; the exchange rate was 
escalating against the local currency (Kinsey 1999). Meanwhile, other social, economic 
and welfare needs became of primary importance at this time for example, education, 
health and housing gained prominence during this period. Droughts and severe budgetary 
restraints limited government options on land acquisition. Furthermore, a haphazard 
acquisition guided by land offers on the market which was not good quality land but 
mostly unproductive areas dented the faith placed in the programme. This situation was 
further worsened by the corruption in land allocation to underpin political support 
especially in the second phase of the land reform process (de Villiers 2003:12-13; Adams 
2001:42; Moyo 1995:4; Moyo 2001:317). Government bureaucracy also contributed to 
the slow pace of land reform. Undertaking land reform took a longer time than necessary 
with the process involving about 25 ministries leading to things getting easily bogged 
down in the process. Provision of infrastructure like roads, clinics, schools was very slow 
and minimal if any leading to the failure to train newly resettled farmers (Mahuku 2005, 
Marinda 2006). In other words, the government did not have administrative capacity and 
ability to implement a sustainable land reform such that: 
 
“From 47 million pounds that the British government released for land reform, 3 million 
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pounds was returned unspent, showing government was not taking land reform seriously 
despite the occasional rhetoric.” (Mahuku 2005:17) 
 
 It is not surprising then; with hindsight, that the fast track land reform was then cited as a 
solution to circumvent some of the hurdles faced in the first and second phases of market 
based land reform. 
 
2.3 Why fast track?  
An examination of the policy framework for the period of fast track land reform might be 
able to provide some insights. Consistent with previous policy pillars, it was derived from 
the pressing national economic and social imperatives of poverty eradication and faster 
economic development. Land was viewed as the engine for economic growth with 
agriculture as the cornerstone of the country’s economy. This then could help explain the 
popular slogan at the time which was ‘land is the economy and the economy is the land’ 
(Utete 2002:19). In other words, fast track policy was formulated with the intention of 
redistributing wealth which was in the form of land lying in the hands of white people. 
The mantra of ‘land is the economy and the economy is the land’ definitely gives this 
association or connotation with wealth, a suggestion carried through by the expectations 
of the resettled farmers. With the government’s touted aim of establishing an indigenous 
farming sector, it was hoped that this would be the vehicle to drive that economic growth. 
In addition to the economic aspect, fast track land reform was also intended as a means of 
de-congesting the overpopulated communal areas thereby presenting an opportunity to 
address an element of government social responsibility (Marinda 2006). 
 
Meanwhile, events were happening on the political and economic arena which it could be 
said that in someway forced the ruling party to show its hand. As will be shown below, it 
has been argued that three factors combined and converged which led to the Zimbabwean 
government embarking on fast track land reform. These were: 
 
1. Spontaneous, largely peaceful land invasions which started in 1998 in Mashonaland 
east province. 
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2. There was a lack of donor support for Phase two and three of the land reform and 
resettlement programme. 
3. The ruling party was defeated in the 2000 referendum with the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) emerging as a powerful political rival threatening the 
hegemony of the ruling elites. 
 
Several authors have referred to the above including among many others, Chaumba et 
al (2003), Human Rights Watch (2002), Sachikonye (2002) and Sithole et al (2003).  
Despite the above assertion, at the beginning of the Fast track land reform programme 
there are claims that the ‘first invasions started in Nyamandlovu and not in Svosve’ as 
widely reported in 1998 and they were ‘politically instigated’ as reported by The 
Independent ( December 2003). In other reports, it is mentioned that Obert Mpofu the 
governor of Matabeleland North led the campaign in the Nyamandlovu area of 
Matabeleland North with 18 properties invaded by settlers (Telegraph August 2000). 
In reports on the situation in Bubi/Umguza it emerged that at Redwood farm, 100 
farm invaders burnt 58 ostriches to death while threatening the farm owner with 
death. They are also alleged to have ‘fired’ farm workers from the farm 
(http://www.hrmforumzim.co.zw, 2001). These events suggest that the issue was not 
about decongesting communal areas but politically motivated to reverse the 
dwindling fortunes of the ruling party. This is supported by the governments own 
assertion that: 
 
“The rejection of the Draft Constitution strengthened the Government’s resolve to 
embark on an accelerated land reform programme.” (Utete 2002:16) 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that: 
At the start of fast track resettlement in 2000, land occupations were 
clearly an illegal process according to the legal framework that prevailed 
at the time. This included the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Land 
Acquisition Act and the Zimbabwe Government Policy on illegal 
settlements, which all recognized the supremacy of private property 
rights. For various reasons, the Government embarked upon a total 
revamp of the legal and judiciary framework in an effort meant to 
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‘normalise’ the situation created by  farm occupations and fast track 
resettlement… (Marongwe 2002:223). 
 
From the above it becomes apparent that the laws were put in place after the event; 
fast track resettlement, rather than the law coming first as is normally the 
case/practice. For example, the legitimization of land occupations by the Rural Land 
Occupiers Act which protects occupiers who were settled on the land by the first of 
March 2001 (Marongwe 2002) thus nullified and abolished property rights of farm 
owners.  
 
When linked to the failure of the Government’s Draft Constitution during the 
referendum, it only then becomes logical to associate this enactment of laws after the 
event, with the fast track resettlement and the apparent attempts to speed up the 
process as Nelson Marongwe (2002) above rightfully points out.  
 
It is undeniable that there existed an uneven and unfair land ownership pattern in the 
country biased in favour of the white minority population as has been referred to 
earlier (Kinsey 1999, Moyo 1995). On the one hand, the Zimbabwean government 
used this leverage to gain some political mileage through needs and grievances it had 
failed to adequately address in all its years in power; 
  
 …..political issues of concern in redressing colonial grievances arising 
from          land expropriation, inequitable and unjust land redistribution 
have tended to be limited by  nationalist discourses which restrict the 
claims to land to the ‘indigenous’ or those who are ‘citizens’ or 
‘members of the community’ based upon a narrow definition of these 
concepts (GOZ:1998:13). 
 
As most scholars would agree, the first phase of land reform after independence did 
not achieve much in terms of families resettled on commercial farming areas (Palmer 
1990, Kinsey 1999, Moyo 2001, UNDP 2002, de Villiers 2003). Significantly too, 
there was not much change in the pattern of land ownership. Of fundamental 
importance is the fact that farms obtained under the ‘willing seller’ and ‘willing 
buyer’ principle largely came from the lower potential Natural regions III, IV and V 
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(Rowntree 2006) areas which were not the best commercially viable places for 
settling large masses of displaced people.   
 
It could then be argued that the government could only resettle very few people in 
terms of numbers resettled as they had to be careful to strike an ‘ecological’ balance 
with the demand for land (Kinsey 1999, Moyo 2001). Given that the available land 
did not provide much room for settlement of a huge number of the black population 
needing land, therefore, it could be claimed that white commercial farmers had not 
been forthcoming and honest in their dealings with government in making available 
enough good quality land for redistribution. In addition, the number of farms put on 
offer by large scale commercial farmers for government acquisition, decreased 
significantly (Utete 2002). To circumvent this, the government ended up enacting the 
Land Acquisition Act in 1992 which made it possible to facilitate land delivery for 
subsequent reform processes through compulsory land acquisition (UNDP 2002) 
although the good policy was hampered by lack of funding. 
 
In the later stages of the second phase and the period leading up to fast track land 
reform, complicating the problem was the legal maze the government had to wade 
through. This legal maze was used by the white commercial farmers to stall the 
process while the number of legal challenges to land acquisition increased overall. 
For example, Justice for agriculture (JAG) a very radical group of commercial 
farmers; emerged in June 2002 opposed to agreements with government and at the 
same time mounting challenges to the land reform process (Utete 2002) through the 
courts. It has to be borne in mind that since 1980, when Zimbabwe attained its 
independence, security of tenure had been assured for commercial farmers with the 
law enshrining, protecting and guaranteeing property rights. These were the same 
laws and guarantees which the white commercial farmers under the auspices of the 
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) used to full effect to frustrate and challenge the 
Zimbabwean government in the 1990’s leading to that slower pace in the land reform 
process (Moyo 2000, Palmer 1990, Kinsey 1999, Utete 2002). When it came to fast 
track land reform, many were of the view that the white commercial farmers had no 
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protection and recourse to the law which would guarantee their rights to the land they 
were settled on as had been the case in the past. 
 
2.4 The turning points 
During the first quarter of 2000, there was massive occupation of a huge number of 
farms by angry ex-combatants. This followed the country’s rejection in February 
2000 of a new draft constitution which included a critical clause on compulsory land 
acquisition (Moyo et al 2000:183). It has to be mentioned at this juncture that white 
commercial farmers might have unwittingly brought this fate upon themselves. This 
they did by blatantly supporting the opposition (MDC) through funding and other 
logistics in the campaign against the draft constitution. In their quest for self 
preservation, the clause on land acquisition was a real threat to the prevailing status 
quo, the white commercial farmers forced the ruling party’s (ZANU PF) hand, 
leading to the no holds barred, gloves off approach taken by the state in dealing with 
intransigent farmers during this phase of fast-track land reform. From inundating the 
state media with images of commercial farmers donating to the opposition, the very 
public image was created on issues of ‘sell-outs’’ thus stoking the flames of hatred for 
the white commercial farmers and all that they stood for whether “British” or 
returning the country to white rule. Thus, when the rallying call for land invasions 
was made, there was no shortage of willing people to join in despite the fact that 
some of these land invasions were stage managed by war veterans and party loyalists 
as a show of support for the Zimbabwean President (Chaumba et al 2003). 
 
At the same time or in conjunction with the above, parliamentary campaigns were violent 
and full of intimidation. Government then passed enabling legislation after the Fast Track 
Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) had already begun as the ruling party sought to 
appropriate and legitimise the process. Sithole et al (2003:11) summarized the process as 
follows: 
While the early spontaneous invasions by the peasants were hailed as the 
unfolding of a genuinely people-centred story on land reform, the later 
invasions by war veterans were a politically motivated story crafted by 
the state. 
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Merber (2001) also claims that the frustration of parts of the population was abused by 
government as an attempt to maintain political power. The land issue thus became a 
vehicle and tool to channel conflict over an unresolved issue into gaining political 
support while at the same time being used to mete out violence to the opposition. The 
same government that had failed to adequately address the issue in earlier times now 
sought popular support by advocating militant ways of land redistribution. The state 
blatantly ignored the rule of law it had established at independence. In some ways this 
could be viewed as populism at work. Before the June 2000 parliamentary election, 
ZANU PF leaders were calling for a speedy reclamation of land from the ‘whites’ and 
instigated as well as supported the land occupations while the MDC called for a 
transparent market driven process of land acquisition (Moyo 2001:314). This clearly 
points to the fact that the neo-populist stance adopted by ZANU PF of fast track 
resettlement was a political ploy of survival in the context of a very serious threat to its 
hold on power. 
 
The Fast Track Land Reform Programme has allowed the government to acquire more 
farms cheaply, quickly (table 2.1 below) and in a less tedious manner than they would 
have if they had followed a market based system (Moyo 2001:330; Villiers 2003:207). In 
some ways, this could be viewed as a success on the part of government when taken in 
the context of black economic empowerment or affirmative action. In terms of numbers 
of the resettled, fast track land reform figures appear to be impressive despite the skewed 
and haphazard nature of the redistribution. Approximately 300 000 families were 
resettled on approximately 11 million hectares by 2003 while the large scale commercial 
farming sector had shrunk down to 1 million hectares from the 15.5 million hectares of 
1980. When these numbers are compared to the 1980 numbers of 162 000 families 
targeted for resettlement with only thirty percent of these resettled amounting to 48 000 
families, the latter pales into insignificance (Sachikonye 2002). It has to be stated though 
that the criteria for the selection of settlers were drawn up long after many farms had 
been invaded. Thus the touted ‘decongestion of communal areas’ as the basis of land 
reform could not stand up to the test. In addition, ‘the selection mechanisms by which 
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households were selected as beneficiaries were subjective, that is dependent on local 
level variations’ (Fox et al 2006:6).  
 
Table 2.1: Progress in land redistribution as at October 2002 
 
Resettlement phase Families resettled  Area (ha) 
1980-1998 71 000 3 498 444 
1998-June 2000*  4 697   144 991 
Fast track A1 160 340 7 269 936 
Fast track A2   27 854 1 680 197 
Land still to be planned and 
allocated 
   1 562 454 
Total 232 738 14 156 022 
Source: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlement. * Phase is referred to as the beginning of fast 
track resettlement 
 
As argued by Moyo (2003:330,313) fast track land reform in Zimbabwe has shown that 
‘the neo liberalist policy framework can be challenged’ since in the ‘past twenty five 
years, attempts to resolve the land question by means of market instruments have failed 
to redress the colonial legacy of grossly inequitable land ownership.’ Certainly, 
Zimbabwe has provided and sounded a warning to other countries like South Africa and 
Namibia on how best to structure their land reform process. Zimbabwe’s experience to a 
major extent has encouraged greater cooperation and honesty in the manner in which 
South Africa for example has handled its land reform process. 
 
The Zimbabwean government adopted a neo- populist ideology of dealing with the land 
reform programme. The neo-populist framework tends to adopt a redistributive land 
reform that transfers property rights to overcome inequality by expropriating land from 
large land owners to redistribute to poor peasants (Byres 2004: 24). In the Zimbabwean 
situation, this could apply to the A1 model of farms that were distributed under the fast 
track land reform programme to many households. Redistribution of land has also been 
granted under the ‘highly individualised (relatively secure) model used for redistribution 
since 1980 using large individual holdings under the A2 model that consolidates notions 
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of private property’ (Lahiff 2003:4) as the table below indicates:  
 
Table 2.2 Resettlement and land redistribution status (A1 & A2) since inception of fast 
track land reform programme as at February 2006 
 
Province A1 resettlement A2 Resettlement 
 No. of 
farms 
Area (ha) Beneficiaries No. of 
farms 
Area (ha) Beneficiaries 
Manicaland 240 215 427 11 921 211 102 215 1 040 
Mashonaland 
Central 
340 568 197 14 939 319 259 489 2 243 
Mashonaland 
East 
446 437 269 26 027 370 314 233 4 512 
Mashonaland 
West 
772 811 033 25 501 665 873 111  4 269 
Masvingo  219 750 563 26 400 166 341 000 1 160 
Matabeleland 
North  
263 520 214  8 311 142 259 659    230 
Matabeleland 
South 
226 383 140  9 839 145 288 239   574 
Midlands 240  451 242 17 760 262 243 611  828 
Total 2740 4 137 085 140 698 2 208 2 681 642 14 856 
Source: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement   
 
The figures cited in the table are impressive when compared to the earlier figures quoted 
during the first phase of land reform soon after independence. The numbers of people 
resettled were much higher than had been the case earlier. Generally, the two 
Matabeleland provinces contributed the least number of farms for both A1 and A2 in 
comparison to the other provinces. Under A1 resettlement, Matabeleland North 
contributed 263 while Matabeleland South contributed 226 farms while on the A2 
resettlement, Matabeleland North was lower with 142 with Matabeleland South bringing 
in 145 farms. 
 
Two resettlement models were used as the table shows, Model A1 and Model 2. Model  
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A1 was intended at decongesting communal lands whose carrying capacity for both 
human and livestock requirements had been exceeded. It was for the generality of 
landless people, with a villagised and self-contained variant. It has to be noted that A1 
farms typically include a small area of arable land, at least 3 hectares, but sometimes 
more depending on the agro-ecological zone. A much larger area of communal grazing 
land could provide a total area of as much as 70 hectares, depending again on the agro-
ecological zone (UNDP 2002).  Model A2 on the other hand, was aimed at creating a new 
cadre of black commercial farmers with the scheme comprising of small, medium and 
large-scale commercial settlement. The latter was based on the concept of full cost 
recovery from the beneficiary (Utete: 2002) supposedly targeting people with capital 
assets, agricultural skills and entrepreneurial abilities. Average farm sizes were 45, 34 
hectares for farms that were planned and pegged with farms that were settled on 
averaging 38, 08 hectares (UNDP 2002). 
 
2.5 The role of war veterans 
The war veterans played a significant role in leading and organizing the land invasions 
that took place around Zimbabwe (Chaumba et al 2003). Basing on claims that land 
reform is almost always a political process especially where it seeks to address demands 
for land restitution from dispossessed groups (Walt’s 1999); the role of war veterans then 
comes under close scrutiny. The question to be answered is what political role these 
former liberators played?  During the height of fast track land reform, those leading the 
clamour for land were war veterans who succeeded in capturing the symbolic apparatus 
of the liberation struggle by embracing extreme nationalism, militarism and the return of 
the land to the dispossessed. While this happened, government seemingly lost control as 
more and more invasions took place across the country (Lahiff 2003).This loss of control 
showed when war veterans challenged the nationalist government’s commitment of 
improving people’s livelihoods and reducing poverty. The war veterans did this by 
pressing for financial compensation for their role in the war of liberation. When the 
government relented by giving a once-off gratuity payment of Z$50 000 and Z$2 000 
monthly payment for life, picking up the cause for land became a natural progression for 
these former liberation heroes (Chaumba 2006, Human Rights Watch 2002). 
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 It has to be pointed out that these invasions to a greater extent were led and organized by 
war veterans in defiance of the government and the ruling party in particular. Alexander 
in Hammer et al (2003:73) observes that: 
…politicisation and autonomy of land committees was particularly stark 
in Matabeleland where ZANU PF had been resoundingly beaten (in 
elections) in both urban and rural areas. In Matabeleland North, 
provincial, Governor Obert Mpofu provoked massive protest when he 
said that ‘only ZANU PF and war veterans qualified for fast track land.  
 
The statement above when examined would lead one to concluding that it was only war 
veterans and party loyalists who were the only people deserving of land  resettlement 
suggesting politics of patronage as key to land resettlement. For example, of all A1 
designated farms, a quota of twenty percent was specifically set aside for war veterans 
while some Resident Ministers also set aside the same twenty percent quota for A2 farms 
despite the latter not being government policy (Pazvakavamba 2006). This does validate 
the point that war veterans were seen as a special class of people deserving of land 
resettlement. The above statement then seemingly goes hand in hand with the claim from 
the South African conference policy paper which states that: 
 
“Unmet demands for land rarely result in violence, but when violence does arise it is 
usually the peasantry who is victimised and rendered powerless in the face of entrenched 
elites or the powerful new elites created by policy interventions”. (Sue Mbaya 2001) 
 
 In this instance, the war veterans become the ‘new elites’ together with ruling party 
officialdom and because of their association or link with violence, (refer to the death 
threats and alleged firing of farm workers in the earlier section 2.3), they wield power to 
assert themselves and hold dominion over the weak. Similarly, Walt (1999:12) claims 
that movements of the poor spearheading demands for redistribution become subject to 
political manipulation which could lead to violent conflict in the worst case scenario. It is 
in this context then that the research gives reference to the deaths of Martin Olds and 
Gloria Olds in the fast track land reform contest that took place in Bubi/Umguza. There 
were alleged shootings between the farmer and the war veterans which led to the 
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subsequent deaths of the two named parties in two separate incidents (Human Rights 
Watch 2002). In the same vein, Marongwe (2003) argues that transfer of power from 
government departments to rural district councils to war veterans made the whole process 
of land redistribution and resettlement less transparent. Thus it was undemocratic 
resulting in the elite and supporters of the ruling party benefiting most from the chaos. 
 
 Finally, while land reform is generally accomplished under pressure from those 
demanding redistribution usually the landless poor, it can also be used as a counter 
revolutionary strategy (Chaumba et al 2003). This is done in the hope that people will be 
content with the token changes to the land tenure system for example and put aside their 
other demands (Chaumba et al 2003) just what the Zimbabwean government hoped 
would be the case. This could explain the treatment of white farmers as the enemy 
(supporters of the opposition) while the war veterans energies had to be channelled 
towards land expropriation to avoid them being a real threat to the ruling party politically. 
  
2.6 The macro-economic environment 
To a large extent, the economic conditions prevailing in the country had a major 
contributory role in the events that led up to the fast track land reform programme. With 
the introduction of the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) in 1991, the 
government at a very fast pace, liberalised the agricultural sector by championing an all-
out production-for-export drive removing export promotion measures which had existed 
since the 1980s. Liberalisation of trade followed together with the de-controlling of the 
foreign exchange market while import licenses and tariffs on imported goods were 
removed. In addition, tariffs on imported inputs were raised to a point were by 1995, 
tariffs on inputs were generally higher than those on finished products (ZCTU 1996, 
HDR 2003). 
 
 Such a harsh macro-economic environment of high interest rates, low domestic demand, 
devaluation and loss of external markets especially affected the agricultural sector. This 
resulted in increasing re-organisation of large-scale agriculture leading to a change in the 
employment conditions of farm workers as a result of shifts in land-use towards more 
 
 
 
 
 31
intensive export crop production. The deterioration in employment conditions saw an 
increase in the percentage of casual workers from 20% to 45% while the real value of 
their wages became less than it was in 1976 (ZCTU 1996; Moyo 2000). Basing on figures 
from the Human Development Report of 2003, structural unemployment was estimated to 
be above 60%. In addition, between March and December 2003, the Zimbabwean dollar 
lost 360% of its value against the United States dollar (HDR 2003). This was the 
culmination of a spiralling economy which had been on a downwards roller coaster ride 
since the infamous once off Z$50 000 dollar payout each, to war veterans for their 
participation in the war of liberation. This money was paid out in November 1997 which 
became infamously called ‘black November’ leading to the first real crash of the 
Zimbabwean dollar which has been in a free fall ever since. The situation was made 
worse by the Z$ 2 000 monthly payments for a lifetime that were to follow after the 
gratuity payout (BBC 2006, Chigumira 2006). In a country that was already straining 
from the burden of domestic and foreign debt, Zimbabwe could not afford such a huge 
dent on the fiscus. 
 
The gratuity payout occurred in an economic climate of an increasing budget deficit since 
1997 and which continued unabated. Inflation had spiralled out of control leading to a 
shrinking economy. Diminishing exports caused a decline in foreign currency earnings. 
Furthermore, reductions in aid inflows and foreign direct investment resulted in little 
money for buying agricultural inputs or ensuring food security by importing to make up 
production shortfalls. Since 1999, real gross domestic product (GDP) has been 
contracting by over 4% with the BBC in April 2006 reporting that the figure had reached 
1 043% (BBC 2006, Chigumira 2006, Save the Children Fund 2002). Table 3 below 
highlights two of the key economic indicators, real Gross Domestic Product and annual 
inflation illustrating these points. 
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Table 2.3: Selected economic indicators 1995-2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Real GDP 
% 
0.2 9.7 1.4 0.8 -4.1 -6.8 -9.5 -14.7 -14.0 -8.2 -7 
(est.) 
Inflation  
% 
22.5 21.7 18.9 31.7 58.5 55.9 71.9 133.2 365.0 419.9 585 
(est.) 
 
Source: Chigumira 2006 
 
Thus it is under such conditions of high unemployment, shrinking wages and a shrinking 
economy that fast track land reform took place. Avenues had to be opened to absorb the 
increasingly restless and impatient masses for who the liberation promise was becoming a 
very bad dream. The resuscitation of the war veterans as a force to be reckoned with 
threatened the political elites; thus the harnessing of this new force to lead another 
revolution against former colonialists who in this case were the white commercial 
farmers (Chaumba et al 2003a, Mahuku 2005, Marinda 2006). It is in this context then 
that fast tack land reform occurred though it brought about unintended consequences as 
table 4 below shows. Invasions resulted in a huge drop in four main commercial crops 
grown for export in large scale commercial farms. Inadvertently, this reduced 
Zimbabwe’s foreign earnings worsening an already precarious existence for many 
especially commercial farm workers and casual labourers among others while the 
government lost out on much needed revenue. 
 
Table 2.4: Declining production of four main commercial crops from the Large Scale 
Commercial Farming Sector in tonnes 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Maize 648 000 810 000 384 000 185 400 80 000 
Tobacco 191 500 232 250 197 200 159 360 60 520 
Soya beans 150 000 169 000   65 000   35 000  30 000 
Wheat 281 250 225 000 282 000 115 000  24 200 
Source: Chigumira 2006  
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The above table shows the declining production levels from the periods at the beginning 
of land invasions to the period when fast track land reform had been in practice for a 
period of time. For example, Maize production in 1999 was 648 000 tonnes but in 2003 
that had significantly reduced to 80 000 tonnes. Such a huge drop of 568 000 tonnes 
affected the country’s food security as the same reductions in production occurred in 
Soya beans and Wheat though not in the same levels but a contributory figure to the food 
security of Zimbabwe. 
 
2.7 From Neo-liberalism to Neo-populism 
This section focuses on conceptual ideological issues underlying fast track.  
It might be argued that Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform is a reaction against the neo- 
liberalist tenets of liberalisation and privatisation. This is justified as it came after the 
failure of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, a World Bank initiative. It is 
contended that the government’s failure to establish a flourishing and viable agricultural 
sector in the 1990’s could be partly attributed to ESAP policy, which undermines targeted 
support to vulnerable groups (ZCTU 1996:2). Following from this, it may be argued then 
that there was a development ideological shift from neo-liberalism to neo-populism ‘in 
favour of redistributive land reform as the best means of eradicating rural poverty and 
securing rapid agricultural growth in contemporary poor countries’ (Mkandawire 
1996:338). The example of Taiwan serves to underline the point of a successful 
redistributive land reform (Byres 2004). The Zimbabwean scenario called for an 
alternative agricultural policy to change the situation hence the adoption of fast track 
resettlement to counter this failure and create ‘desirable agrarian change’ (Byres 2004). 
Such an agrarian change would entail; ‘A land reform which expropriated from the large 
landowners and redistributed (land) to the poor peasants would remove at a stroke the 
major cause of factor market imperfections in agriculture’ (Byres 2004:35). It has to be 
noted that expropriation and appropriation were some of the tools used in Zimbabwe’s 
fast track land reform programme with compulsory acquisition of land largely from white 
commercial farmers being undertaken without any payment of compensation. 
 
 Part of this shift came from the recognition of the failure of neo-liberal market economy 
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solutions to generate recovery and growth in poor countries and the calls to ‘get 
governance right’ (Mkandawire 1996:338).As will be shown, the failure of the earlier 
model of ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ to generate enough land for resettlement was an 
indictment on the Zimbabwean government. The market based model was premised on 
the notion that ‘whites who wished to keep their farms were free to do so and only under-
utilised land would be acquired by the government….to be paid for immediately and at 
full market price remittable in foreign currency’ (Palmer 1990:4). The land made 
available was inadequate, marginal, unproductive land which could not suit the 
government’s needs leading to envisaged targets not being met. Such failure called for 
‘appropriate action’ to be taken which would ‘require a thoroughgoing redistributive land 
reform which would transfer property rights in cultivable land from landlords to small 
peasants and landless labourers’ (Byres 2004).For the Zimbabwean government, this 
became the justification for the state to take action through fast track land reform. 
 
With regard to getting ‘governance right’ this proved to be untenable in the case of 
Zimbabwe, given the growing discontent threatening the ruling party’s political 
dominance. Faced with such a scenario, the ruling elite used the political trump card of 
‘land to the tiller’ the rallying cry of many liberation movements (Moyo 2003) that would  
bring in the political support despite the obvious economic ramifications associated with 
such a policy. Therefore, ‘land to the tiller’ may be ‘championed by anti-colonial 
nationalists, agrarian populists, bourgeois modernisers and socialists in particular 
conjunctures of social and political struggle’ (Bernstein 1996:33). The adoption of neo-
populism invariably a ‘potent, seemingly radical appeal since its concern is with the poor 
and it argues for egalitarian, redistributive measures as the means of eradicating poverty’ 
through ‘massive state intervention’ (Byres 2004:47).  
 
Land reform is often viewed in moral and political terms as a necessary means by which 
land may be redistributed to the landless and the poor to help alleviate poverty. To use 
Scott’s (1977:244) argument in Byres; 
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In the agricultural sectors of most countries, there is a highly unequal 
distribution of land and hence of other productive resources and political 
power. This gives rise to factor market imperfections in the allocation of 
resources in rural areas which allow one to characterise the existing 
systems of land tenure and present government policies as both 
inefficient and inequitable. (Byres 2004:46).  
 
 
This was the situation for Zimbabwe as well. Politically, land resettlement was used as a 
reward for struggles for liberation that could help explain the part played by war veterans 
in Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform. Thus their feeling of entitlement to the land and 
their forcing of the government’s hand in speeding up the pace of land reform can also be 
viewed as politics of power at play.  
 
Berry (1993:69) also makes the point that even where private property rights in land in 
sub-Saharan Africa exist ‘de jure’, it is typically impossible to protect them against ‘de 
facto’ customary claims. This could explain the justification for squatters and settlers 
when they occupied land farmed by white farmers as they felt they had a legitimate 
ancestral right to the land. Such justification was solidified by the tacit backing of organs 
of the state.  
 
Moyo 2001 (314-316) explains it thus: 
The prospects of democratisation and egalitarian land reform in 
Zimbabwe diminished as a result of the change in policy thrust from 
socialism to Neo- liberalism. Issues of redistribution and state 
interference in land markets were overshadowed for some time by macro 
economic reforms in the context of structural adjustment. After the 
failure of structural adjustment to live up to its rural development 
policies’ promises, the land question resurfaced as the legitimate item on 
the poverty reduction agenda of the World Bank while at national level, 
the same failure made demands on the ruling party to redeem its 
liberation promise. 
 
 As such the neo-populist stance adopted by ZANU PF, of fast track land resettlement 
was a political ploy of survival in the context of a very serious threat to their hold on 
power. Observations from a conceptual standpoint assert that ‘politics of belonging and 
exclusion from programmes emphasising social justice, basic human rights and social 
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security for the weak has in itself weakened the constituency for land reform in 
Zimbabwe’ (Moyo 2000:188).This is because of the exclusive and arbitrary nature of the 
way fast track land reform was conducted in Zimbabwe. Through the government’s tacit 
failure to observe the rule of law and respect property rights of white commercial 
farmers, the whole process has been viewed as a vindictive and vengeful act on the part 
of the ruling party. This view is also supported by the observation made by Walt 
(1999:12) when he states that ‘land reform programmes led by the State can become tools 
for patronage and a different kind of political manipulation.’  
 
To conclude this section, it has to be pointed out that land reform can take several 
possible forms apart from the redistributive element that has been associated and linked 
with the Zimbabwean programme. It can be based on market principles as the World 
Bank aligned ‘willing buyer; willing seller’ programme was or it can take the form of 
restitution as is the case of South Africa. In addition, it can take the form of community 
assisted land reform as happened in some parts of southern Africa. 
 
2.8 International and regional dimension to land reform issues 
However egregious the fast track land reform programme in Zimbabwe has been, in 
terms of human rights violations, and scale of state-supported violence, the action of the 
state to curb the market power of large scale land holders is not inconsistent with similar 
policy thrusts observed in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America and Asia (Byres 2004, 
Mbaya 2001). Expropriation of large land holdings for settlement by smallholders has 
been attempted in many countries. There have been great successes, notably in Japan, 
Korea and parts of West Asia, and partial successes in some Latin American countries. 
However, there have also been significant failures some of these countries experienced 
(Walt 1999). Redistributive land reform programmes implemented in Central America 
and Asia in the 1950s through the 1970s included strong arm tactics to help “force” land 
redistribution from elites to poorer citizens (Mbaya 2001). 
 
 Measures differed from country to country but included inter- alia expropriations, land 
taxation, and limits on number and size of land holdings by vested elites. For most, the 
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proclaimed objective in specific contexts and instances was to boost small farmer 
productivity and efficiency in combination with poverty reduction (Mbaya 2001). 
Expropriation has resulted in the state taking and handing over, to the poor or majority of 
the population, farms that were derelict or under-utilised from mostly absentee landlords 
or land speculators residing elsewhere (Hall 2003, Palmer 1990). Land taxation entailed 
putting a heavy tax on land to discourage the land speculators and those holding on to too 
much land so that if there was no productivity they would be forced to sell to government 
and others who would put the land to good use (Lahiff 2003, 2005). Limits on number 
and size of land holdings aimed at boosting the numbers of small farmers basing on the 
argument of the farm size-efficiency relationship. Generally, the thinking is that smaller 
farms are more efficient than their larger counterparts and more labour intensive in their 
mode of production (van Zyl 1996). Running parallel and complementary to such 
initiatives, there was the imperative to resolve and pre-empt rural sources of social unrest 
and political disturbance. South Africa and Brazil including some countries in Central 
America to a limited extent provide recent and current examples (Bernstein 2002) of such 
efforts.  
 
A new trend emerged in the 1980s. This trend saw a shift in energies away from land 
reform efforts on a global scale. It marked the beginning of the movement away from 
redistributive land reform to market-assisted land reform (1990s) and currently to 
community-assisted land reform (Bernstein 2002). The reasons for this policy shift are 
multiple and complex but at least three factors played a role:  
 
1) The after effects of the Arab Oil embargo in the late 1970s and a shift in policy focus 
to structural adjustment programs to curb macro-economic imbalances, 
 2) Sagging support for land nationalizations in donor countries; and  
3) Redistributive reforms proved too bureaucratic, cumbersome, slow, and costly. 
(Rogier van den Brink 2002). 
 
Land reform policy in Southern Africa has been shaped from lessons learnt from the 
Central American and Asian countries. Although for the most part Zimbabwe has 
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provided a source of reference on how not to conduct a chaotic land reform to the other 
countries. Its example also serves as a spur to steer progress in land reform used by 
certain groups threatening expropriation to farmers unwilling to cooperate. In Namibia, 
the government threatened to employ the same tactics to put pressure on recalcitrant 
farmers while local communities led by the Landless People’s Movement have threatened 
to follow suit in South Africa when land reform seemed to have stalled (Marinda 2006, 
de Villiers 2003). 
 
 On several occasions key policy makers from Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
proclaimed “…willing seller – willing buyer approaches may be obsolete for the needs of 
rapid land redistribution and poverty alleviation.”(Lahiff 2005; Mbaya 2001; de Villiers 
2003). Governments are already pursuing a variety of mechanisms to increase the ability 
of the state to redistribute land from large-scale sectors to the poor as seen by efforts in 
Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. Potential funders and donors need therefore 
support to seriously reconsider their policies against paying for land purchase and 
increase funds for resettlement costs. Whether future land policy emphasizes 
redistributive land reform or community-assisted land reform, the facilitation costs to 
recreate capacity in local communities and empower them to govern and assume control 
over their livelihoods will be gigantic. Yet, set against the political instability and future 
violence of slow-paced land reform, it is in the interest of all parties to work on ways to 
reduce land inequality. 
 
Of late, there has been a shift in policy with governments now involving a number of 
stakeholders in the formulation and implementation of their policies. South Africa, 
Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Uganda have involved civil society, 
former colonial governments and churches including people at the grassroots levels 
leading to popular participation in the shaping of land policy (Hall 2003). A huge 
departure from policies of the past where political expediency was the norm with 
decisions being centralised and handed down to the communities affected. Economic 
considerations, issues of social justice and equity have all contributed to the shift in 
current policies. Recognition of customary rights to land in new tenure laws in South 
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Africa, Mozambique, Uganda and Tanzania can be linked to the issues of social justice 
(Hall 2003). Encouragement of agriculture in towns and cities as in Zambia and Namibia 
which provides secure land tenure rights for informal urban settlers is recognition of the 
urban poor’s right to use unutilised land to subsidise their incomes (Palmer 1990; 
Toulmin 2000). 
 
Benefiting from hindsight, South Africa’s land reform policy attempted corrective 
measures to those disastrously applied in other African countries. Kenya’s competent 
small-holder farming has influenced South Africa’s black commercial farmer’s policy, 
with the intention of creating a new class of commercial farmer acceptable to the political 
dispensation (van der Brink 2002). World Bank linked market reforms have helped shape 
this cautious restrained approach, underpinning the export oriented, intensive production 
aimed at maximising export earnings while meeting home consumption needs (Lahiff 
2001; de Villiers 2003). 
 
 Other forms of land reform have been observed in South Africa taking various forms.  
For example, a ‘cash for claims’(Restitution) policy of paying land claimants in cash 
instead of land is a departure from most African government policies  (Mbaya 2001,de 
Villiers 2003,Van der Brink 2002). Through this policy, South Africa has prioritised food 
production over popular politics. Secondly, engagement with both white and black 
commercial farmers in policy formulation as opposed to disengagement of the former 
reveals the government’s pre-occupation with capitalism as opposed to populism for its 
sake. Thirdly, adopting a rights-based approach that restores rights of indigenous people 
living on state lands has been balanced by the discouragement of informal urban settlers 
like those of Bredell, Khayelitsha and other would be squatters who the government has 
dealt with strongly (Marinda 2006). However, this has not prevented the landless from 
resorting to covert resistance by garnering micro victories without challenging the status 
quo. Through encroachment on individual farms, people overtook legal processes by 
occupying the land they claim under restitution, peri-urban squatting and through theft 
from the white farming community (Ruth Hall in Mbaya 2001) have been some of the 
ways of undercutting government and the rule of law. Such covert means have been used 
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by the weak to assert their agency to the state and land owners. This action becomes a 
weapon of the weak in a silent but effective war that involves direct action by the 
powerless. 
 
2.9 Perceptions of fast track land reform 
This section will now link the above international and regional dimensions of fast track 
land reform to an examination of the perceptions. Literature review shows that in 
Zimbabwe, beyond the political pronouncements and apparent enthusiasm for the 
redistribution of land, there were other perceptions from different groupings in 
Zimbabwe. The majority among the international community including civil society 
groupings and non-governmental organisations were of the opinion that the 
implementation process was not broad-based and thus not sustainable (Alexander and 
McGregor 2001, Chaumba et al 2003, Mahuku 2005, Marinda 2006). It was felt that the 
programme needed the participation and involvement of all stakeholders. Compromise 
was needed from all parties with the government needing to formally incorporate the 
divergent contributions of internal and external stakeholders in the implementation 
process. With the accompanying political rhetoric, threats of a return to war and actual 
violence from state organs and war veterans, the process was clouded with suspicion, 
mistrust, animosity and in some worst case scenarios outright anger and  warring conflict 
(Chaumba et al 2003). In such a polarised atmosphere, the perception of land reform as a 
two way battle between government and large-scale commercial farmers, with all 
stakeholders reduced to spectators in a wait and see attitude/mode (UNDP 2002, Hammer 
et al 2003 and Human Rights Watch 2000) grew and could not be easily dismissed.  
 
Justifying the above perception was the involvement of Provincial Governors/ Resident 
Ministers in the fast track land reform process (the case of the Matabeleland North 
Resident Minister Obert Mpofu has been cited earlier in the section on war veterans). 
This added an unprecedented political flavour to the whole process, an aspect that had 
been missing in the earlier phases of land reform. Prior to fast track, considerations were 
more technically and professionally biased with a focus on maintaining agricultural 
production trends. Dictating the pace of land redistribution were experts in different 
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fields making the whole process technocratic and orderly. On the other hand, fast track 
resettlement witnessed an absence of an agreed policy and procedure resulting in varying 
perceptions in different provinces depending on the political thrust in the province 
(Chaumba et al 2003, Marimira 2006). Thus some provinces depending on the strength 
and organisation of the local war veterans were slow in uptake as opposed to other more 
militant and active war veterans associations. 
 
 This absence of agreed policy consequently saw all land regardless of its status targeted 
for redistribution. Therefore, land that had previously been exempt from the 
redistribution programme suddenly became available again including land under Bilateral 
Protection Agreements (Pazvakavamba 2006). For countries like Britain and other 
European countries including multi-nationals like Anglo-American and LONRHO, 
whose lands were ceased despite the prevailing agreements; the perceptions varied from 
seeing these acts as diplomatic gaffes to seeing them as acts of retaliation by a 
government under siege and looking for a scapegoat. 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has tackled the process of land reform by providing the background to it. 
Through pointing out some of the factors which slowed down the earlier phases of land 
reform, it points us to the causes of fast track land reform. Among the factors discussed 
was the major role played by war veterans linking the land reform to the struggle for 
liberation and election promises made. The dire macro-economic situation that was 
prevailing in the country also contributed to the push for land reform. Theories of neo- 
liberalism and neo-populism are used to explain the process which leads to look at the 
international and regional dimension of land reform and how it relates to the situation in 
Zimbabwe.  A brief look at perceptions based on literature review ends the chapter to 
shed light to the study on Umguza. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND UMGUZA DISTRICT 
PROFILE 
 
3.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, the author will discuss the research methodology used in the study. The 
sample will be described followed by the data collection method and analysis in order to 
answer the research questions. Also included will be an explanation of the ethical 
protocols adhered to in undertaking this study. A brief description of the respondents who 
took part in the survey will also be given. 
 
The selected study area represents an area which was involved in violent skirmishes in 
the early phases of the fast track resettlement, as has been referred to in Chapter Two. 
The selected study site represents an interesting continuum of the rural-peri-urban 
environment, with Bulawayo being the second city in Zimbabwe. The specific study sites 
are Umguza Estate and Hilda’s kraal in Umguza which were former large scale 
commercial farms. Both were settled under A1 self-contained, villagised and small-scale 
commercial type farms under fast track resettlement scheme. 
 
3.1 Methodology 
Qualitative methodology was used in the study due to the researcher’s exposure and 
familiarity with methods in this field. It was also felt that such methodology would 
provide depth to a study of perceptions. In addition, limited time and resources were also 
key factors considered before the selection of the methodology. To supplement the in-
depth interviews, secondary data was also used in the study. This took the form of an 
analysis of some previous studies done on the same topic of land reform (not just fast 
track land reform) by other authors. Such literature helped the researcher to explore the 
different schools of thought on land reform in Zimbabwe whilst prodding the writer’s 
own thoughts on the subject. As expressed by Leedy (2001:8) that: 
  
“Research is rarely conclusive. In a truer sense the research cycle might be more 
accurately conceived of as a helix or spiral of research. In exploring an area, one comes 
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across additional problems that need resolving. Research begets more research.”  
 
Therefore, this research as part of that spiral will contribute its own small portion to the 
whole in order to further enlighten and add to perceptions on the subject of the fast track 
land reform programme. In order to produce ‘rich thick’ information (Babbie 1995, Long 
2002), the design of the study was more than descriptive; it also combined elements of an 
exploratory and narrative text at the same time. This enabled the researcher to tell the 
story of the respondents. It was thus seen as practical and relevant to use qualitative in-
depth interviews as the data collection method in order to understand the facet of fast 
track land reform as it affects people in Matabeleland with special focus on the area of 
Umguza. Qualitative research for this particular study was also used as the approach is a 
less structured, non restrictive way of collecting data allowing the researcher to gain 
insights not offered by quantitative research (Mouton and Marais 1990; Reid and Smith 
1981). 
 
3.2 Research design and scope 
The research has limited its focus to a documentation of fast track land reform in Umguza 
resettlement scheme as seen through the eyes of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in 
the area. Only specific informants were interviewed to highlight their understanding of 
interventions within specific socio-economic and political localities in Umguza. 
Qualitative research methods were used mostly as they give an insider perspective 
allowing one ‘to view the world through the eyes of the actors themselves’ (Babbie and 
Mouton 2001:271). Qualitative in-depth interviews bring an expose` of the fast track land 
reform programme (FTLRP) allowing for depth in information gathering. Key informant 
interviews were conducted with authority figures in the area to get official viewpoints of 
issues. Interviews were audio taped, with the interviewee’s consent having been obtained 
first, in order to capture their statements and perceptions accurately for the write up. 
These were later transcribed with the resulting texts used for analysis purposes to 
facilitate the emergence of insights which would otherwise have escaped the interviewer 
in the interview process. 
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3.3 Overall design 
A small sample of respondents, 80 in number, was chosen as the target of study in 
Umguza. Because it was designed to be an intensive study, qualitative in-depth 
interviews were used to gather pertinent data in line with the research. The reason for 
choosing this method of study was based on the premise of qualitative research which 
claims that the research provides for an understanding of people from their own 
worldview (Long 2002, that is allowing one ‘to view the world through the eyes of the 
actors themselves’ (Babbie and Mouton 2001:271). Qualitative research mainly aims to 
understand social life and the meaning that people attach to everyday life. This is done 
through eliciting participants accounts of meaning, experiences or perceptions producing 
descriptive data in the participants own words; a process which includes identifying the 
participants beliefs and values (McRoy 1995). 
 
3.4 Key informant interviews 
 Key informant interviews were carried out on authority figures (5 people) in the area to 
get an official viewpoint of fast track land reform in the area. These interviewees 
included the deputy District Administrator, Land resettlement officer, the local headman 
of the area, a war veteran leader and the opposition candidate for Member of Parliament. 
These interviews were conducted to gain insights from people directly involved and 
affected by fast track land reform in Umguza. The Deputy District Administrator and the 
Land Resettlement Officer would give the official perspective. From these two 
interviewees would emerge the policy position and the administrative capacity of the 
Zimbabwean government in relation to the fast track land reform programme. The 
responses would indicate how far the government had prepared for the fast track land 
reform process, how different it would be from the land reform processes earlier; criteria 
used for selection of land recipients and other pertinent points which only officials could 
give answers to. 
 
The other interviewees would give the local perceptions of fast track land reform. The 
local headman would give the traditional authority version of events and the perceptions 
thereof. This would help indicate how far involved traditional figures and structures were 
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in the fast track land reform process and also indicate what administrative role they 
played. War veterans were important role players in fast track land reform as indicated in 
other studies on fast track land reform in Zimbabwe; hence it was important to see the 
role they played in Umguza. The interview with the local opposition candidate for 
Member of Parliament was conducted as a measure of balancing perspectives and getting 
the other view not influenced or tainted by government ruling party lines as the other 
interviewees might be. 
 
 Interviews were audio taped with the interviewee’s consent so that respondents’ 
statements and perceptions could be captured accurately for the write up. These were 
later transcribed with the resulting texts used for analysis purposes to facilitate the 
emergence of insights which might have escaped the interviewer’s attention during the 
interview process.  
 
3.5 Target population  
The process of data collection entailed in-depth interviews with the district administrator, 
one councillor, five waiting list applicants and five land beneficiaries to fully cover the 
issue from formulation to implementation. These people then formed the researcher’s unit 
of analysis. Two interviews were done with the district administrator as he was seen as a 
key informant and official government spokesman in the district. The district 
administrator was more than willing to participate in the study and particularly helped to 
secure the participation of the other respondents. As it was, he was responsible for the 
finalisation of the land claims with all the land disputes pertaining to the area falling 
under his jurisdiction. In this regard, he became an invaluable asset to the research as he 
was able to provide much of the background regarding the area and the local politics 
whilst providing a vital link to the contacts necessary to carry forward the data collection 
part of the study. Thus, it seemed logical that he was in a better position to answer the 
key research questions: whether the process was transparent or not, whether it was a 
politically driven process or an administrative process and if it had any real value to the 
beneficiaries rather than as just a reward for party loyalty. 
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The respondents were targeted for the varied voices which it was felt their views would 
represent. By also including the non-beneficiaries of land reform, the idea was to hear the 
other side of the story something that could be juxtaposed with the land reform 
beneficiaries. While the councillor is purely a political figure through and through, it 
cannot be denied that land reform in its very nature is a political process thus the voice of 
the governing party through its very own representative becomes necessary. In this way, 
the researcher could be able to gain an insight of what the ruling party thinks through its 
party functionary about the implementation of fast track land reform in Umguza. The 
councillor would be the best placed person besides the district administrator to answer the 
question of politicisation of land reform in his area. 
 
3.6 Description of Settlers 
The settlers were a mixed lot, made up of mostly civil servants, a few ex-farm workers, a 
large number of war veterans mostly ex-officio army officers and some top ranking party 
officials belonging to the districts or branch levels of the ruling party, ZANU PF, in 
Bulawayo (the second city). Among these were a variety of business people with links to 
the ruling party in one capacity or the other. There was a sprinkling of people drawn from 
the nearby communal area of Nyamandlovu but even these on closer inspection, it 
emerged that some had links to the ruling party in one way or the other. As has been 
mentioned most of these beneficiaries came from Bulawayo and included a few 
headmasters, senior teachers, railways workers and professionals from different fields of 
government. 
 
 There were some people among these professionals and business people whose origins 
were from as far afield as Mashonaland. This was not well received by the predominantly 
Ndebele speaking people of this locality, even among the beneficiaries themselves. They 
felt that they would not have stood the same chance had they too applied for land in 
Mashonaland basing on their origin and language. Actually one of the beneficiaries, a 
serving member of the national army confessed that he had to give up his claim in 
Mvuma because of the language barrier and the fact that he was made to feel unwelcome 
at that resettlement leading to the situation becoming untenable and unbearable. Another 
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interesting feature of these recipients was the age range which began from the late-forties 
going upwards, which could point to the fact that most were war veterans of the liberation 
struggle. Another likely explanation could be the fact that most young people, under 
forty, in this area (mostly in Matabeleland) work in South Africa as migrants and as such 
were not involved in land reform programme. 
 
 There were very few women among the beneficiaries, with the majority of these coming 
from single-headed households. This too could be explained by the strain and toil it took 
to successfully lay claim and settle in fast track resettlement which most married women 
could not go through. This was not aided by the violence which preceded fast track while 
the rumours and stories about the goings on in these resettlement schemes were not 
acceptable to any self respecting married woman or even single mature woman.  
 
 The small number of women land recipients can be explained by the socially embedded 
nature of land as a resource and the power relations that govern land allocation in 
societies. Therefore, the mutuality and inter-dependence between men and women needs 
to be recognized when it comes to land issues. Consequently, more than gender identities, 
it is other cross-cutting identities of ethnicity, kinship relations and marital status that 
both motivate women to stake their claims as well as oppose the claims of other women 
and men (Nitya 2005). Secondly, women’s land claims seem to have a chance of 
becoming effective only if they have male support. Therefore, rather than aligning with 
other women, those serious with their claims seek to build alliances with men particularly 
those able to influence their claim to land. Because women’s land claims are a gender 
issue, women are unwilling to mobilize around this issue despite the enhanced resistance 
from men (Nitya 2005). As a result the profile given with regards to the gender numbers 
of the land recipients shows a disproportionately high number of males compared to 
women.  
 
3.7 Methods of data collection 
For the purposes of data collection, there was only one instrument chosen - the 
questionnaire, which was in the form of a structured set of questions to guide interviews 
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and maintain consistency. It can be argued that for all intents and purposes, it was the 
most practical, feasible tool for the research considering the limited resources, the nature 
of the mini thesis and the student’s limited experience with other tools of research. The 
study adopted the guidelines of the ‘strategic triangle’ Moore (1995) as the model of 
policy assessment that directed and shaped the collection of data. For example the 
following guidelines were adhered to in this strategic triangle: 
 
The first core issue was the test of legitimacy and political sustainability. This examined 
government support in implementing fast track land reform and problems thereof linked 
with the programme. In other words, what was being investigated under this section were 
questions that link the politics of land reform tying them together with legitimate 
concerns for addressing inequalities and injustices of the past period of colonialism. The 
second test of administrative and operational feasibility considered vision and mission of 
government structures, organisational structure, management problems related to the 
operations and management of land reform. Some of the issues under exploration or 
scrutiny in this section were support services provided by government and the general 
readiness of government to implement the process in terms of infrastructural provision 
and management of the whole fast track land reform process. Finally, under substantive 
value, factors that enhance the value of life of beneficiaries were examined. This 
incorporated needs of subsistence, protection and sustainable livelihoods and security of 
tenure to mention just a few. The issue of fast track land reform adding substantive value 
to recipients’ lives is what was being put to the test in this section of the questionnaire. 
 
Data gathered through the questionnaire survey was complemented by a thorough 
analysis of available literature on the case studies and documents at district level. Primary 
data gathered from the field was then analysed after the base from the secondary data had 
been laid. District level documents were collected during visits to the study area from 
such institutions as Agricultural Rural Extension Services (AREX), District Development 
Fund (DDF), the War Veterans Association and Umguza Rural District Council. 
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3.8 Conducting the interviews 
Filling in and completion of the questionnaire was done by the researcher. The reason for 
this was that the researcher felt that it would be easy to redirect questions and repeat 
where necessary where there might be feelings of inadequate answers or answers that 
might have missed the question. A better way of conducting the research than sending the 
questionnaire and allowing the respondents to fill it in themselves. This then combines 
the advantage of observation as a research tool in combination with the written 
questionnaire. In this way, some terms could be clarified right there on the field, rather 
than waiting to hazard a guess as to what the respondent might have intended from an 
unclear or ambiguous written response. Interviews took between two to three hours 
following the structured questionnaire. The structured interview was divided into several 
sections covering the sub sections in the questionnaire. Open ended questions were used 
with the respondents which encouraged them to answer the questions in full whilst taking 
their time about it. This was to give the survey respondents an opportunity to state strong 
opinions, vent their frustrations about fast track land reform whilst letting the researcher 
know what had been overlooked (Salant 1994). 
 
 By directing the interview process, the researcher could pay more attention and explore 
in greater detail certain major issues that he felt needed further exploration. Therefore, 
the face to face interviews helped to overcome the fears and the unwillingness to respond 
that could have resulted from choosing any other method. By its very nature, the research 
into fast track land reform required trust between the researcher and the respondent to 
ensure confidentiality. This helped to make the questions less threatening, friendlier by 
the explanations that were given and the homily atmosphere created by the researcher 
during the face to face interviews. Discussions on violence and security of tenure took 
place during the informal sections of the interview which also incorporated issues on 
personal experience and predictions for the future of land reform in Zimbabwe. 
 
3.9 Data analysis 
Applying Moore’s (1995) theory of a strategic triangle as a model of policy assessment 
was a great aid in the process of analysis. This was useful in the preliminary analytical 
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step before transcribing the recorded data. The researcher’s analysis was guided by Miles 
and Huberman’s (1994) approach to qualitative data analysis in this instance applied to 
the questionnaires that were used. This involved having a starting list of codes based on 
the theoretical themes emerging from the interview format. 
 
This was done in the following way: Firstly, a thorough reading of all the interviews was 
conducted by the researcher as a familiarisation exercise with the data. This is important 
as a close reading of the data gives the researcher an opportunity to interact with the data 
as a whole (De Wet and Erasmus 2005). The second step in the process was to proceed to 
do what Miles and Huberman (1994) call first-level coding of the data. This involved 
data selection and assigning some labels to these pieces of information. On one hand, De 
Wet and Erasmus (2005) give credence to what Dey (1993) says about the process of 
selecting a bit of data and assigning it to a category which, out of necessity entails data 
fragmentation. In line with them, Miles and Huberman (1994:70) discuss ‘first level 
coding as a device for summarising segments of data’. Furthermore, according to De Wet 
and Erasmus (2005:9) coding or assigning the labels to data is not done randomly, but 
‘codes are partly analytical as they link various segments of text to a particular concept.’  
Babbie (1995:366) states that the coding process helps ‘to quantify the open ended 
interviews…..thus reducing a wide variety of idiosyncratic items to a more limited set of 
attributes comprising a variable.’  
 
Given that earlier, Moore’s (1995) strategic triangle had been adopted as a method of 
organising the data systematically and a way to rigorously analyse the data, codes were 
then developed into three theoretical questions following Miles and Huberman’s (1994) 
recommendations. This data was then systematically grouped from codes into concepts 
and much broader codes, what Miles and Huberman (1994) call second level coding. In 
this phase of coding, data was grouped into codes or broader codes in order to come up 
with a hierarchy of codes; a process that researchers call “coding trees” (Babbie 
1995:367). This systematic procedure helped to interpret the difficulties and /or success 
that government faced in trying to put fast track land reform into practice in 
Matabeleland. Additionally, the researcher decided to compare and contrast the codes to 
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see how they related to each other. Grouping together all those categories that related to 
each other, the researcher categorised them into a theme. For example, all the categories 
that were directly linked to social and  ideological issues were grouped together under the 
theme or category ‘Social and Ideological Factors’, which in turn formed much of the 
broader theme “legitimacy, economic and political sustainability’’ drawn from one of the 
theoretical questions.  
 
The next step of the analysis noted the relationships, patterns and explanations of the 
categories. It was noted for instance, how the codes of categories and their properties 
within the broader theme ‘Beneficiaries’ related to each other and how this second level 
code related to another second level code ‘ Ruling Party functionaries’. It was also noted 
how many respondents adopted more or less the same position with regards to 
explanations; for example beneficiaries and which ones adopted a different position for 
example non-beneficiaries. For an explanation of this discordance, the writer had to come 
up with what both Fielding and Lee (1998) refer to as a ‘storyline’ or explanation. An 
important point to note here is that ‘the central phenomenon has to be given a name and 
as a category must gradually be related to other categories’ (De Vos 2002:350) 
 
 For an illustration, the storyline which emerged from the theme ‘Quality of life’ was that 
fast track resettlement did not necessarily improve the quality of life of beneficiaries. 
Although the beneficiaries felt getting their own land was government’s way of 
empowering its people; the lack of funds, inadequate farming expertise on their part and 
lack of any real extension support, would result in failures in the long term.  
 
3.10 Challenges of undertaking research in a volatile situation 
By its very nature of delving into the politics of the land reform programme in 
Zimbabwe, this research was bound to encounter obstacles. Foremost amongst these, 
were government institutions and officials who have a high suspicion of anybody 
investigating the land issue in Zimbabwe as this has become highly politicised. As has 
been mentioned in the literature review, the violence that accompanied fast track land 
reform in the late 1990’s- 2000’s polarised individuals into supporters and non supporters 
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of government. As Habakkuk (2005:4) asserts: 
Land reform has become a scheme to line the pockets of fat cats and 
hangers on with no clue of agricultural production. This means that 
constitutional amendments pertaining to land may legalise official 
looting of land by party functionaries at the expense of deserving 
peasants and agricultural college graduates. 
 
The study intended to investigate the extent to which this assertion obtained on the 
ground in Umguza. This would be done by focusing on in-depth case studies and the key 
informant interviews with people who benefited and those who did not from the fast track 
land reform programme. On the other hand, on the ground there was potential danger 
from the war veterans and supporters of the ruling party who were equally suspicious of 
outsiders (Hammer et al 2003). 
  
Due to the polarized nature of the subject under study and the highly charged atmosphere 
of fast track land resettlement, the researcher had to be highly sensitive to the needs and 
demands of the respondents under study. Some topics or questions could not be pursued 
as long as the respondents felt uncomfortable with them, while others had to be asked in a 
round about way to get to the root of the story. It has to be mentioned that for most, fast 
track land reform was seen as a highly political issue which showed one’s loyalties 
depending upon the individual’s take on the subject matter. In such an environment, the 
researcher had to pay careful attention to the respondents political feelings whilst trying 
desperately to remain as objective as humanly possible.  
 
Coupled with this was dealing with the spiralling economic situation prevailing in 
Zimbabwe. Having had experience with NGO’s, most respondents expected monetary 
rewards for their information which made the task difficult when one had to explain to 
them that this was a study for academic purposes. It took great powers of persuasion to 
overcome this reluctance to volunteer information but the researcher’s former colleagues 
who were now administrators helped a lot to provide that all important breakthrough. The 
economic situation also affected the researcher who had to ensure that his money was 
spread too thin to stretch through the entire research period. Lack of personal means of 
transportation led to the choice of the study area being the one accessible by road since 
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one could not go deeper into the areas without public transport. 
 
3.10 (b) Limitations of the study 
Another obstacle to the study was the fact that not much literature has come out of 
Matabeleland with regards to land reform but especially on fast track resettlement. The 
mini-thesis does make use of studies conducted by Alexander McGregor but as has been 
made apparent in this study, most of the Zimbabwean literature comes from Mashonaland 
and Manicaland the crop producing areas of the country. Thus the dynamics tackled 
herein might not have an easy comparison to match or compare with. This is not to say 
that there were no similarities at all, but in one dimension, it presents challenges of a 
different nature which the researcher had to overcome on his own without referral to 
other precedents. As the work had to be done, this researcher had to be resourceful in 
overcoming these constraints and challenges.   
 
3.11 Ethical issues  
The very basis of the research demanded a researcher who would be aware of the 
potentially sensitive nature of the research topic. To this end, ethical research practices 
recommended by Babbie and Mouton (2001) were followed. Prior to the research taking 
place, permission had to be sought to conduct the interviews from the authorities 
concerned. Relevant authorities were approached to seek the necessary permission to 
conduct the study. Letters were written to the individuals involved while permission was 
sought from the interviewees concerned. An explanation of the purpose of the interviews 
was made clear before the interviews. From then on, the respondents’ informed consent 
was sought prior to the interviews. Informed consent implies that ‘adequate information 
on the goal of the investigation, its procedures, the credibility of the research and the 
possible dangers to which the respondents may be exposed be rendered to potential 
subjects’ (Williams et al 1995:30). Thus informed consent meant giving an explanation 
of the purpose of the research; that, it was for academic purposes only and the 
respondents’ right to decline or accept taking part in the research would be respected.  
   
Confidentiality of respondents would be respected following applied regulations and 
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ethics of research. To support this, their identity would be protected by maintaining 
confidentiality throughout the research process and in writing the thesis. Therefore, all 
the persons interviewed did so freely, knowing that the information they gave was for 
academic purposes. In this regard, ‘informed consent becomes a necessary condition 
rather than a luxury or an impediment’ (Hakim 2000:143). The real names of 
interviewees were not used to preserve anonymity and protect the individuals’ privacy.  
 
Finally, there is the situational atmosphere that faces the researcher in the politically 
volatile context of Zimbabwe. To navigate this atmosphere, the researcher took great 
responsibility to respect respondents and their opinions. What was given precedence was 
the respondents’ well being rather than the academic gains of the researcher. As a result, 
fairness was sought in the research process by distributing equally the risk of 
participation for respondents and the need for gaining access to their information and 
knowledge. As such, findings from the study will be presented as accurately as possible 
to include opinions that are at variance with the researcher’s propositions and 
expectations. Lastly, interviewees were assured that if they would want to see the results 
of the study, a report was going to be made available to them. The next section focuses 
on the profile of the study area. 
 
3.12 Umguza district profile 
In this section, the district profile is given to situate the study. The area covers 837 478 ha 
with a population of 73 314 at the last census of 2002. Demographic data shows that 
there were 38 760 males and 34 554 females while there was a total of 16 031 
households. It is one of seven districts making up Matabeleland North province. As the 
youngest or newest district, it has 18 wards and 108 villages with administration offices 
in Bulawayo. It shares borders with Umzingwane and Insiza in the east, Matobo and 
Bulilimangwe in the south, Tsholotsho in the west, Lupane and Bubi in the north with its 
environs surrounding Bulawayo. Its average rainfall is 450-600mm per year, typical of 
agro-ecological region IV with temperature ranges of 8.7-27.5°C making it very dry but 
very suitable for livestock and wildlife ranching. The major crops grown in the area are 
maize, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, round nuts and wheat. In winter, wheat is grown 
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with the water drawn from irrigation. The irrigation schemes face problems which 
include lack of up-to-date irrigation infrastructure, lack of skills for irrigation agriculture 
and shortage of agricultural inputs. Farmers in the area compete with the city of 
Bulawayo for water rights since Umguza lies in the Nyamandlovu aquifer. With some 
investment, the area can become a green belt of agriculture. There was a proposal to draw 
water from the Zambezi River, to adequately supply the city of Bulawayo when it was 
faced with serious water shortages. If this were to happen, Umguza would stand to 
benefit as the area lies along that particular route.  
Table 3.1 below summarises the availability of water in the district 
 
Water as a resource 
Functional dams and boreholes Non functional dams and boreholes 
14 functional dams 2 that are non functional 
256 functional boreholes 25 non-functional boreholes 
 
75 awaiting drilling 
 
 
Total 270 functional dams and boreholes  
 
3.12.1 Economic Profile 
Umguza district has tourism potential since it lies in the Nyamandlovu aquifer. There is 
plenty of wildlife which includes Kudu, Impalas, Zebras, Elands and Warthogs. But like 
most fast track resettlement areas, poaching has become a huge problem since 2000. 
Forestry areas also present big commercial opportunities in Umguza with two small saw 
milling companies doing timber harvesting. Forestry land occupies 92 512ha that are 
protected and administered by the forestry commission. This forest land is to be found in 
Umgusa, Chesa, Insezi, Umzibani and Insuza Extension. 
 
In relation to agriculture, the area has large scale commercial farming, small-scale 
commercial, resettlement and communal areas. Small-scale commercial farmers used to 
occupy a greater part of the district, covering 397 844ha. The general produce is chicken, 
pigs, vegetables, potatoes and tomatoes. Farmers employ a large number of people in the 
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district and market their produce in Bulawayo. There are a small number of farmers who 
practise market gardening and also supply Bulawayo with fresh produce on a daily basis. 
As for the large scale commercial farmers their focus is cattle and wildlife ranching and 
employ a sizeable number of people. Umguza has 290 farms, of these, 209 were gazetted 
for resettlement leaving out only 23 white owned farms plus 35 farms that were either 
owned by social institutions like churches or fell under bilateral trade relations with other 
countries. Sixty seven of those that were gazetted were then de-listed according to the 
department of Lands office records.  Communal areas cover 42 635ha and include Fingo 
and Ntabazinduna. Crops grown include maize, the country’s staple food which is grown 
seasonally. The average population density is 10.9 per square kilometre which is a very 
high population density by Zimbabwe standards. The total population was estimated at  
18 000. 
 
3.12.2 Resettlement areas 
Resettlement areas are divided into different sections some with Model A schemes 
having 33 self-contained units and 54 villagised units. Model A schemes include Insuza, 
Igusi and Nyamandlovu. These Model A schemes are the old type schemes from the early 
phase of resettlement soon after independence and they cover an area of 64 838ha. The 
new resettlement area covers a total of 196 120ha under A1 and 28 052ha under A2. 
Resettlement has created a demand for education and health facilities resulting in satellite 
schools and clinics. Currently there are 13 satellite schools with no sanitary facilities 
whilst rural electrification is incomplete in most schools. 
 
3.12.3 Water 
The district has little surface water but a lot of underground water as in the Nyamandlovu 
aquifer which is benefiting Bulawayo and some of the newly resettled farmers on 
irrigation schemes. As the statistics below show, irrigation is the backbone of agriculture 
in this area with the largest number of irrigation schemes being found in the A2 
resettlement with 57 followed by commercial farming areas with 14. Small scale 
commercial farms and communal areas have four each, while the A1 has 7 and the old 
resettlement has 2 irrigations schemes. 
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 Table 3.2 Water availability 
Irrigation schemes  Dams 
A1 7 Functional  14 
A2 57  Non-functional 2  
Commercial 14 Total 16 
Small-scale commercial 
farms  
4   
Communal areas  4   
 
 
There are a total of 16 dams with 14 being functional and only 2 being non-functional. 
The water situation in Umguza is an advantage which has to be fully exploited when 
considering the agro-ecological zone in which the area lies. 
  
3.12.4 Agricultural production 
Agricultural production for the 2002-2003 season was low for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the previous 2001-2002 season had been a drought year and as such farmers did 
not anticipate a better season. Secondly, the two seasons were at the height of the land 
invasions and the uncertainty surrounding the whole process meant that the newly 
resettled farmers were not sure of the permanency of their stay in the allocated farms. The 
fact that some newly resettled farmers lost their pieces of land after having been allocated 
land in the first place because of the confusion with the gazetted lists of names added to 
the uncertainty of fast track land reform. Other factors contributed too like the availability 
of only 90 MT of seed which was inadequate for the 18 wards. The Grain Marketing 
Board (GMB) and the Agricultural Rural Development Authority (ARDA) provided 
fertilizer, some 120 MT Compound D and Ammonium Nitrate. The uptake for the 
fertilizer was low due to the poor season previously thus it was not used adequately to 
benefit agricultural production. Draught power was being offered by the District 
Development Fund (DDF) tillage tractors but it was inadequate to cover the whole area 
(information gathered from key informant interviews with the deputy district 
administrator). The other point to be made is that the whole process of allocating the 
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tillage tractors was decided upon on the strength of one’s political connections and not on 
fair allocation of ‘first come first serve’ therefore becoming inconsistent and thus 
unreliable. In addition, machinery such as combine harvesters and planters were 
inadequate for use by every farmer in the resettlement area. As first time farmers, of 
which most of the land recipients belonged to that category, they did not have adequate 
inputs on their own to successfully farm commercially and their lack of agricultural skills 
combined to contribute to this decline in production levels.  
 
Food prices in the district reflected the economic situation prevailing at the time with 
those having resources taking advantage of those who did not have. For example, Maize 
cost Z$6 600-8 0001 per 50kg bag at the time while cattle cost Z$800,000-1,000,0002 per 
head depending on the size of the beast. Goats cost Z$150,000-200,000 (2005 figures) 
depending on the size of the goat and the month of the sale. If the period of selling was 
closer to schools opening or the festive season, prices went up in the same manner that 
prices went up if the sale was between a local farmer and an outsider like teachers or 
visiting business people (information obtained from key informant interviews with the 
area councillor). 
 
3.12. 4.1 Agricultural data 
The next section will compare agricultural data over three different seasons, from 2000-
2001 right up to 2002-2003 seasons using the following given statistics: 
Total Cultivated 
Land 
2000-2001 season 2001-2002 season 2002-2003 season 
Large scale 
commercial farming 
30 000ha 
 
6 500ha 5 000ha 
Small scale 
commercial farming 
3 800ha 4 100ha 2 800ha 
Communal areas 4 100ha 
 
3 140ha 4 220ha 
                                                 
1 1US$1 = ZW$825in 2003 
2 1US$1 = ZW$61,040 in 2005 
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Resettlement area 23 000ha 24 500ha 19 500ha 
Resettlement area 
A1 
 4 800ha 3 800ha 
Resettlement area 
A2 
 750ha 
 
850ha 
Total 60 900ha 42 340ha 36 170ha 
Area under Cereals   23 318ha 
Average yield                                     1 tonne/ha 
 
 
From the given statistics, there is a noticeable decrease of total cultivated land from large 
scale commercial farming from 30 000 ha in the 2000-2001 season to 5 000ha in the 
2002-2003 season. This translates to 25 000ha of large scale commercial farming land not 
cultivated, a significant figure in lost agricultural production. The decrease is not gradual 
but a huge drop even when compared to the figure for the season in between,that is the 
2001-2002 season where total cultivated land for large scale commercial farming is 6 
500ha. This is a difference of 23 500ha of uncultivated large scale commercial farming 
area. Even when comparing the totals for the three seasons, the same pattern emerges of 
lost production land that was not cultivated. The statistics show that in the 2000-2001 
season a total of 60 900ha was cultivated, whereas in the 2001-2002 season a total of 42 
340ha was cultivated, whilst in the 2002-2003 season only a total of 36 170ha was 
cultivated. The total lost land that was not cultivated amounts to 24 730ha when you 
subtract the total of the cultivated land for 2000-2001 season with that of the 2002-2003 
season. 
 
A possible explanation would be that this is the land that was taken up for resettlement as 
the two seasons after the 2000-2001 season show by the two additional columns of 
resettlement area A1 and A2. But then the figures do not add up as the totals above show. 
To highlight this fact further, in the 2001-2002 season, resettlement area A1 has                    
4 800ha while resettlement area A2 has 750ha under cultivation which when added 
together gives 5 550ha, a figure too small to make up the difference of land unaccounted 
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for in the column of large scale commercial farming. Under this column, large scale 
commercial farming has only 6 500ha under cultivation when compared to the earlier 
figure of 30 000ha in the 2000-2001 season. The other columns like small scale 
commercial farming though showing an improvement from 3 800ha in the 2000-2001 
season to 4 100ha do not account for this missing hectarage. The same could be said 
about the other two categories, communal which actually show a decrease while the 
resettlement area only has a slight increase of 1 500ha. One can go on, but the most 
plausible explanation is that of fast track land reform beginning to seriously affect large 
scale commercial farming. Commercial farmers abandoned or fled their farms while the 
new farmers because of lack of inputs and the confusion surrounding allocation, could 
not adequately fill the gaps left by these farmers. The figures then tell a story of lack of 
production and the costs associated with inadequate capacity in terms of resources and 
skills. 
  
A1 farmers cultivated an average of 0.5ha each during the 2002-2003 agricultural season 
because they did not clear their fields on time. This had resulted from the confusion 
created by the circulation of new government gazetted lists of names of land recipients 
some of which did not resemble the original lists containing the names of the land 
beneficiaries. Also adding to the confusion was the tussle between the rural district 
council and the war veterans association. The latter wanted to play a major role in 
determining who got access to land and who was denied while the former fought to make 
it a purely administrative process not influenced by party politics. Compounding this was 
the case of seed and draught power shortages which badly affected the new farmers in the 
fast track land reform programme as they did not have adequate resources to be self-
reliant but were mostly dependent on government parastatals for inputs. 
 
3.12. 5 Social infrastructure 
The following section will discuss the social infrastructure of Umguza district as at the 
time of the research. As can be seen from the table, the primary schools are 42 in number, 
most of these being satellite schools that have been opened to accommodate the children 
of land recipients. The plan was to reduce the distance the children would have to walk 
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from home to school to something less than five kilometres for every child especially the 
grade ones. The same was attempted in as far as healthcare is concerned with 12 clinics 
which included those that were privately run by commercial farmers in their farms meant 
to reduce the number of off days for workers. Some of these offered very basic treatment 
for common ailments while there were 2 satellite clinics which were mobile around the 
less accessible areas.  
 
Table 3.3 Social infrastructure 
Boreholes Dip tanks Schools 
Functional                256 Functional      30 Primary 
schools  
42 
Non functional         25 Non 
functional       
14 Secondary 
schools  
12   
Awaiting drilling      75     
Total                         356     
 
3.12.6 Coping strategies 
Gold panning is rife in the eastern side of the district where the mineral deposits are to be 
found. This is the area too where there are abandoned mines which the mining companies 
felt where not productive enough. In the western side of the district, people survive 
through the selling of firewood some of which they poach from the forestry land 
bordering their resettlement. Women survive and earn an income by the selling of 
thatching grass used to roof the granaries and the mud huts. As the table below indicates, 
there are food distribution programmes supported by non-governmental organizations 
like the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Organisation for Rural Associations for 
Progress (ORAP). These distribute food in schools as supplementary feeding schemes for 
children to prevent malnutrition and also to very desperate households. These food 
programmes become a coping strategy for some of the poorer resettlement farmers and 
even for their relatives or employees who man the fields and occupy the plot or 
household while the land beneficiary is away in town or at their formal employment. 
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Table 3.4 Food aid programmes 
Name of NGO Programme     Area 
WFP/ORAP              School Feeding Programme   Total schools 89,1mt 
WFP/ORAP          General food distribution     Wards 3, 4,5,10.12,13,14,16
 
3.12.7 Wards description 
As was mentioned earlier in the section on Umguza district profile, the area has 18 wards 
each with a councillor as the representative authority although there is a headman in 
especially the communal areas. The wards which were the focus of the study were ward 8 
under J. Zinyemba which was A1 self contained and large scale, ward 9 under Mrs. S 
Mpofu. The non respondents were sampled from wards 4, 5 and 6 which were communal 
areas surrounding the resettlement scheme. 
 
Table3.5 Ward description 
Ward Councillor Population 
(2002) 
Ward 
description 
Location 
1 A.Mhlanga 4 237 Small scale & 
resettlement 
Hope fountain, Gumtree, 
Douglasdale 
2 K.C. Shirichena 10 523 Small-scale & 
commercial 
Kensington, Springs & 
Heany Junction 
3 T.M. Nyilika  3 888 Small- scale & 
commercial 
Fingo & Mbembesi 
4 M.Moyo  4 148 Communal Ntabazinduna North 
5 Mrs. V. Mangaba  3 540 Communal Ntabazinduna South 
6 Z.M.Bhozongwana  3 300 Communal Ntabazinduna West 
7 Mrs. E.Nyoni  4 228 Small-scale and 
large scale,A2 
Montgomery, Imbesu 
Kraal & Fairbridge 
8 J.Zinyemba 4 064 A1 self 
contained & 
large scale 
Umvutsha, Umguza 
Estate, Helensvale  
9 Mrs. S.Mpofu 5 332 A1 self 
contained 
villagised & 
commercial 
Nyamandlovu farm, 
Hilda’s kraal, 
Auchenburg 
 
 
 
 
 63
Table 3.5 continued 
 
Ward Councillor Population 
(2002) 
Ward 
description 
Location 
10 F.Sibanda 2 387 A1 villagised, 
old resettlement 
7 forestry 
commission 
Nyamandlovu farms, 
Hilda’s Sawmills 
11  Sigola 5 051 Old resettlement Insuza 
12 N.Ndlovu 1 795 Old resettlement Igusi 
13 C.Mathe 4 628 A1 villagised, 
self contained & 
large scale 
Nyamandlovu, Red Bank, 
Teakdale 
14 M.S.Khumalo 3 394 A1 villagised, 
self contained & 
large scale 
Nyamandlovu, Chesa,  
Madlulane 
15 D.Moyo 1 552 Urban, large 
scale & A2  
Ngoma township, 
Nyamandlovu centre 
16 H. Mathuthu 8 599 A1 villagised, 
self contained, 
plot holders, old 
resettlement 
Rangemore, Mnondu, 
Woolandale 
17  M.Siphuma  943 Small scale & 
old resettlement 
Maraposa, Majindane 
18 M. Khumalo 1 705 Forestry & old 
resettlement 
Forestry commission, 
Lukukwe 
  
 
3.13 Conclusion 
The chapter began with an explanation of the research methodology used in the study and 
ended up with the description of the coping strategies of land recipients together with a 
brief description of the wards. In the methodology, some of the sub sections explored 
focused on limitations of the study, target population and a description of how the 
interviews were conducted. In between topics that were covered included challenges of 
conducting the study in a volatile situation which was an attempt to put the politically 
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volatile situation of fast track land reform into perspective and how it might affect the 
study. There is also one section in this chapter which covers agricultural production and 
relates the discrepancies in total cultivated areas in three subsequent seasons. The section 
explains away these differences, especially in relation to large scale commercial farmers 
who were forcefully removed to be replaced by new farmers without the means to 
manage this hectarage that had been cultivated by white commercial farmers in the past 
season. Also the uncertainty of the new farmers at the permanence of fast track land 
reform contributed to their wariness and consequently their failure to adequately invest in 
a process which they did not have confidence in since they did not have titles to the land. 
Other issues discussed include social infrastructure found in Umguza and the water 
situation as it relates to agricultural production and irrigation schemes 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter will present the study findings as discovered during the research into fast 
track land reform in Umguza. This chapter examines the perceptions of land recipients 
and those who did not receive land. Of fundamental importance to the analysis is to test 
the position of whether the land question has been finally resolved to the people of 
Umguza. This will be done by examining the socio-political and legal environment 
together with prevailing economic conditions. This chapter attempts to give an insight on 
whether we will witness another land invasion experience in Zimbabwe in future given 
the circumstances under which resettlement was conducted. Would arbitrary disregard of 
the law, for the purposes of political gain and potential benefits, guide future land reform 
in Zimbabwe?  These are questions that will be addressed in this chapter. 
 
4.1. Socio demographic characteristics of the land recipient respondents 
Gender 
On the issue of gender, a huge majority of land recipients were male 90% (n=54), while 
women constituted only 10% (n=6). A likely explanation could be linked to the very 
conservative, patriarchal, traditional society of the Matabeleland people that stems from 
their cultural customs and practices. This practice sees women tending to take a back seat 
to matters political and economic, leaving such issues to the men. In spite of this, the 
generally low uptake is reminiscent of the situation that prevailed in the whole country 
with few women taking up land as opposed to men. This could also be explained by the 
fact that land invasions were violent and accompanied by abuse of women by war 
veterans and militias (Chaumba et al 2003). In such a scenario, very few women could be 
associated with the violence. Of the non recipients respondents, 60% (n=12) were male 
and 40% (n=8) were female. 
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Table 4.1 Age of recipients 
Age group proportion 
30-35 5% (n=3) 
35-45 13% (n=8) 
45-55 55% (n=33) 
55+ 27% (n=16) 
 
 Most of the land beneficiaries, 55%  (n=33) were in the age group that ranged from  45-
55 years , with  27% in the 55+ group and the least number were in 30-35 age range at 
5%. Noticeably, there was a disturbing trend of very few (5%) young people in their mid-
thirties and below who were beneficiaries. Partly true, but another plausible explanation 
could be linked to the high migration rates in Matabeleland North and Matabeleland in 
general with young people moving in droves to South Africa to seek greener pastures 
there.  
 
Table 4.2 Ethnic origins  
Province/area Proportion 
Umguza/Nyamandlovu 25% 
Matabeleland North 22% 
Matabeleland South 19% 
Manicaland 2% 
Masvingo 5% 
Mashonaland East 2% 
Mashonaland West 0% 
Mashonaland Central 7% 
Midlands 18% 
 
 
It became apparent from the surnames of the beneficiaries and their origins that despite 
the original aim of fast track land reform; that of returning land to local people, not all the 
beneficiaries were 'indigenes' (local people who can trace their ancestral roots in the 
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area/surrounding area) but people from areas outside of Matabeleland. Some came from 
as far afield as Manicaland, Mashonaland East and Central. This could partly be 
explained by the fact that most of these people were party functionaries employed in 
various positions in Bulawayo with most in the civil service. Despite that, some laid 
claim to having grown up in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s second city and thus staking their 
claim to qualification for land allocation as other urbanites did. It was only 47% of the 
respondents who could trace their ancestral roots to Matabeleland North with the rest of 
the people coming from outside the province. From this 47%, only 25% of the total 
sample population came from Umguza/Nyamandlovu.  
  
Table 4.3: Education level of respondents  
Level of education Proportion 
Primary 12% (n=7) 
Secondary 57% (n=34) 
Tertiary 31% (n=19) 
 
Fifty-seven percent of the fast track land reform beneficiaries had Ordinary levels or the 
Zimbabwe Junior Certificate. There were 7 (n=12%) respondents with primary level 
education. But even these were not many as some claimed to have supplemented their 
education, that had been disrupted by the war of liberation, soon after independence 
through night school. Thirty one percent had some tertiary education. It has to be pointed 
out that soon after independence, Zimbabwe embarked on a massive education drive 
which advocated for free schooling or minimal payments, a system that benefited the 
black majority. 
 
4.2 Socio economic profile 
A huge number, 58% of households, earned a monthly salary indicative of their being 
employed in various capacities. As has been indicated, there were a large number of civil 
servants from various ministries such as education, police and the security services. A 
small number came from several parastatals in and around the major city of Bulawayo. A 
few had additional income based on the monthly stipends earned by veterans of the 
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liberation struggle. Amongst the respondents, 60% kept cattle, 90% had goats and sheep 
and 85% had donkeys as domestic animals. All had traditional ox-drawn ploughs, with 
5% (n=3) having tractors on their farms which had been allocated to the district for 
communal use. It is these people who had the biggest pieces of land with 10 hectares per 
person and above while the rest were averaging 0.5-5ha per person. Households with the 
smallest hectarage were focused on subsistence farming 53% (n=32) while the remainder, 
47% (n=28%) were farming commercially through market gardening and cereal 
production.  For households’ decision on whether they were commercial or subsistence 
farmers, this was partly determined by their size of household, plot, input availability, 
draught power and economic profile. 
 
Table 4.4: Profile of new farmers on FTLRP in Umguza:  
categories  proportion  
Land recipients in 
employment  
58% 
(n=34) 
Retired   3% (n=2) 
War veterans  23% 
(n=14) 
Businessmen/ 
women  
8% (n=5) 
Ex farm workers 3 5% (n=3) 
Unemployed  3% (n=2) 
Total   100% 
(n=60) 
 
 
 
Livelihood strategies   
A few respondents in the sample, less than a quarter (22%) generated their income from 
the land reform projects. Of those households earning an income from the land reform 
projects, about 25% stated that this was where all their income came from. Among this 
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group were a few enterprising people who made a business out of supplying the needs of 
the land recipients and city residents. The huge majority of households 58% earned an 
income from wage employment outside of land reform (most were civil servants). There 
were those who derived their income from government transfer payments (pension with 
the major payment being gratuities to war veterans). Of those receiving transfer 
payments, about 23% indicated that most of their income came from this source while a 
few, about 20% received remittances from their children outside the country. Included 
among these were the retired and the unemployed. 
 
4.3 Support services 
Government parastatals like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the Agricultural Rural 
Development Authority (ARDA), The Agricultural Rural Extension Services (AREX) 
and the District Development Fund (DDF) provided support services to land reform 
beneficiaries. Eighty percent relied sorely on inputs from GMB and ARDA, 20% (n=12) 
had received formal training from AREX and only 5% (n=3) had received tillage 
equipment from the DDF. 
 
4.4 Selection process 
Of respondents that were land recipients, 15% had applied through the formal process via 
central government, 40% were selected through the local and district offices and 45% 
were invaders whose ownership was legitimized when they were already occupying the 
farms. From an analysis of the findings, it emerges that the selection process of 
beneficiaries was clouded in controversy amidst the suspicion of cronyism and 
corruption. Even the 40% who were selected through local and district offices, 50% of 
these were referrals from war veterans and party officials. This becomes apparent from 
the profile of the respondents which shows that the very poor and landless did not quite 
benefit as had been intended by the policy document for resettlement (see Utete 2002). 
 
The period of residence of beneficiaries varied with 47% (n=28) having been on the 
farms since 2000 when the land invasions first began in Umguza. The rest, 53% (n=32) 
had settled in the farms from 2001 onwards. 
 
 
 
 
 70
 
4.5 Perceptions of fast track land reform 
Perceptions about selection process 
Among the beneficiaries, 10% (n=6) felt that the process was not fair as some people got 
bigger and better plots of land. Thirty percent (n=18) did not express an opinion because 
of the politically sensitive nature of the topic. Sixty percent (n=36) were satisfied with the 
method of identifying and selecting land recipients. Varied opinions were expressed on 
why beneficiaries felt they deserved the land they received.  Chief among the sentiments 
expressed was the view that the resettlement was balancing the injustices of the past as 
seen by the two contrasting responses that follow: 
 
“Land was given to ZANU PF supporters who are paid up members of the party. For 
example, I am a loyal cadre of the party and hold a position in the local cell of the 
Umguza branch. This is a cell we created after invading the farms.” 
 
For people in Matabeleland, Mugabe has not been a good ruler or 
President especially taking into account the Gukurahundi atrocities 
committed against our people. He might try to bribe us with land but this 
will not heal the wounds and scars we have. This land reform has been 
intended to make us forget, but some of us will never forget. 
 
Perceptions of support services 
Eighty two percent (n=49) of the land beneficiaries were unhappy with the service they 
got from ARDA, AREX, DDF and GMB. They felt that it was only the influential people 
who got adequate inputs for their needs since only three people had access to draught 
power provided by DDF. With the inputs that they got, they had no say in what they 
could plant. One could only plant what they were given. Only thirty percent had received 
training from AREX. Access to finance was also a limiting factor with none of the 
beneficiaries having received financial assistance from financial institutions. 
 
Perceptions of benefits from fast track land reform programme 
Although 60% (n=36) were happy with the selection process, 77% (n= 46) felt they did 
not have tangible benefits from having been resettled since they felt the maintenance of 
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the homesteads was costly. Twenty three percent (n=14) felt they had benefited from the 
fast track land reform process as they had acquired assets like farm houses, farm 
infrastructure and other inputs. These same people felt that their quality of life had 
improved as they were earning an extra income from their farm production activities 
either through market gardening or crop production. For these beneficiaries, their food 
security was assured considering the fact that they could afford to supply Bulawayo 
markets with their produce. Of the 46 people who were not entirely satisfied with the 
tangible benefits, 29 felt that they were subsidizing the farming production from their 
own incomes rather than it being the other way. For these beneficiaries, their economic 
opportunities had not improved but were moving towards the negative balance because of 
the extra expenses associated with an extra household. 
 
4.6 Descriptive summary of non-beneficiaries of the fast track land reform 
programme 
Most of the non-recipients respondents 75%, were people older than 55 years (n=15). 
They lived in the nearby communal lands with little education. Eighty percent of the non 
land recipients had had master farmer training from the then AGRITEX. Sixty per cent 
had gone up to Zimbabwe Junior Certificate level, and the rest had primary level 
education.  
 
Thirty percent were not aware of the resettlement process before the redistribution 
process began. Fifteen percent feared the stress of moving, particularly among the older 
people. Forty-five per cent did not trust the fast track land reform process, thus adopted a 
wait and see attitude although 10% had later applied for resettlement in 2002. They were 
all subsistence farmers. Fifty-four percent had cattle, donkeys and goats, 18% had only 
donkeys and goats, 28% had goats only. The major crop produced was maize for family 
consumption with some production of ground nuts, millet and sorghum. The older 
respondents had no formal income mostly surviving on remittances from children while 
the younger respondents 45 years and younger (n=5, 25%) had previously survived on 
seasonal and permanent farm employment before the fast track land reform programme. 
Three of these were now employed as caretakers of those holdings whose owners lived 
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and worked in Bulawayo, the absentee land beneficiaries. 
 
All the respondents in this category come from Umguza rural area close to the 
resettlement farms and felt they had a historical claim to the land. Fifty–five percent felt 
that the selection process had been conducted along political lines while 10% had no 
opinion on the selection process. Thirty-five percent felt that even if they had been 
allocated land they were now too old to use the land effectively. 
 
Support services 
All the non recipient respondents had received support from NGOs such as the World 
Food Programme and ORAP in the form of food and self reliance projects. There was 
dissatisfaction with DDF especially regarding issues to do with draught power. As for the 
seed input from GMB, it was often delayed while distribution was done by one of the 
land recipients; hence there was an element of unfair distribution. 
 
4.7 Perceptions of non-recipients of fast track land reform 
Eighty percent of the respondents felt that there were enough farms to allocate to those 
locals in need. This was because some farms were seen as being underutilized, while 
some farms were believed to be too big for one person. There was concern regarding the 
allocation of farms to people from outside Umguza as they felt that outsiders were 
benefiting at the expense of the locals. All the respondents complained that grazing land 
had been taken up by the resettled farmers. 
 
The respondents felt that the chiefs and headmen should have been part of the official 
selection committee as they were aware of locals’ needs for land. Sixty-five percent of 
the respondents were unhappy with the forced integration of outsiders into their 
communities and the fact that the new settlers had taken over and run down some of the 
infrastructure such as farm clinics. The younger respondents who had previously survived 
on seasonal farm labour felt that their means of livelihood had been taken away by the 
process of fast track land reform. Eighty percent of the non recipient respondents agreed 
with the principle of land redistribution to redress past imbalances while the rest felt it 
 
 
 
 
 73
was unnecessary to carry out the fast track land reform programme. One reason advanced 
against the fast track land reform programme was that it had taken away jobs from locals 
on the farms. 
 
4.8 Land as a sacred heritage 
 When Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe skilfully situated the land question within 
the discourse of colonial land injustice in September 2002 in South Africa; he was 
applauded for capturing the mood of most developing countries’ world leaders and the 
ordinary people. He shrewdly defended fast track land reform as a continuing struggle 
against colonialism, astutely arguing: 
This land, this Zimbabwe, is a sacred inheritance from our forefathers; it 
was the casus-belli of our armed national liberation struggle. It cannot 
be, therefore that we have to beg a foreign power for and we say: hands 
off Britain! Hands off Britain…….. so Blair keep your England and let 
me keep my Zimbabwe.  (Mahuku 2005:13) 
 
At the political rhetoric level, the land issue was used as a political tool to fend off 
growing discontent within Zimbabwe. At the local level in Matabeleland, the same 
sentiments were proffered to push forward another land reform agenda for the 
‘indigenes’. This is supported by the following observation made by one of the 
respondents who had this to say: 
The point being made here is that people from the local community might one day rise up 
to demand their heritage and lay claim to the anomalies created by the fast track land 
reform as having denied them their rightful inheritance. This could be a possibility 
considering the precedent that would have been set by fast track land reform where white 
commercial farmers were forcefully removed from their farms to be replaced by black 
land recipients.  
 
I worry that this (resettlement scheme) will not last for ever as there 
are rumblings from people who were not resettled. As someone not 
originally from this area, I come from Mashonaland province; I fear 
my plot will be taken away should the political environment change. 
There have been threats uttered to that effect and I sometimes fear for 
my safety and security. 
 
 
 
 
 74
From observations made elsewhere in the world and throughout history, it is apparent that 
redistribution of wealth or political power will not occur unless there is sufficient 
pressure on those who hold the balance of power to share their wealth with the powerless 
(Marinda 2006). This can be explained by the wars of liberation fought in colonised 
countries who after the attainment of their liberation, embarked on land redistribution. 
Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa can be cited as regional examples (Marinda 
2006). This same war of liberation argument was used by war veterans to justify fast 
track land reform. 
 
Not everyone shared the same views though. One interviewee had an interesting story to 
tell on his personal experience of fast track land reform. He made the following 
observations: 
Some of us were willing to co-exist with the white farmers so that we 
could benefit from their experience and resources. I had arranged with 
the farm owner to split the farm into two, a portion for him and another 
for me. We were going to share the use of his resources while I also 
acquired experience from his guidance. Alas, the prevailing poisoned 
atmosphere made it impossible. The farmer fearing for his safety fled 
because I could not guarantee his security. I lost out in the end and was 
labelled a ‘sell-out’ because of my humanity towards this white man. 
 
These words from a former ZIPRA commander who was a retired army general are 
sobering and revealing of the nature of fast track land reform. In any other circumstances, 
this private arrangement could have been lauded as being practical and reasonable 
considering the situation. But this was not to be as seen from the comments above. 
  
The prevailing perception was still one of uncertainty despite all the talk of having 
repossessed the land as the rightful heirs to that land. The overriding feeling one got from 
this was that of uncertainty within the land reform process in spite of the assurances from 
politicians. This could stem from the fact that grassroots land invasions were not a new 
phenomenon in Zimbabwe as they had occurred in the 1980’s and early 90’s. Of 
significance is the fact that in many cases, government security forces forcefully removed 
these people from the land. A well known example is that of Ndabaningi Sithole’s Churu 
farm with the people who had resettled there forcefully removed by the Zimbabwean 
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government. The farm was then taken over by the government (Mahuku 2005). Another 
case in point is that of the Inqama settlers who had settled themselves at Cecil John 
Rhodes National park outside of Bulawayo in Matabeleland South. These too were 
forcefully evicted by security organs of the state under the guidance of Dumiso 
Dabengwa the then Minister of Home Affairs (Habakkuk 2005).It became a different 
issue altogether under a politically charged environment. When the Commercial Farmers 
Union (CFU) took the farm invasions of 2000 issues to court, the then Home Affairs 
minister, Dumiso Dabengwa said 
 
“The War Veterans have broken the law; I have therefore instructed War Veterans to 
withdraw from farms with immediate effect. I recognize that the owners enjoy as much 
rights to protection as any other citizen in this country.” (Mahuku 2005) 
 
Nonetheless, farm invasions continued unabated with white farmers being labelled 
enemies of the state. No action was taken against illegal occupiers despite farmers having 
obtained High Court and Supreme Court declarations ordering their removal. The ruling 
party was not prepared to risk being unpopular with the war veterans and the ordinary 
people at this delicate stage (election year) of the fast track land reform programme. 
 
The war veterans believed that by embarking on land invasions, it was a way of forcing 
the government to hasten the redistribution of land to peasants in order to meet liberation 
promises. It was a way of empowering the ordinary people by resorting to direct action as 
a weapon for the weak in relation to the powerful white commercial farmers. It has to be 
pointed out that this direct action also happened in an environment whose socio-
economic context facilitated the actions. This economic situation became a variable that 
could not be easily ignored. The high level of unemployment, coupled with the 
deteriorating standards of living, with fewer opportunities for income generation, all 
contributed to land invasions. When worsening food insecurity is taken into account, land 
invasions were seen as creating opportunities for the poor by the poor in their direct 
action. 
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4.9 Households   
Households followed the trend in most of Matabeleland with fewer families. For 
example, many of these consisted of the nuclear family with a mother, father and their 
children. Sixty percent (n=36) of the land recipients did not live on the farm permanently 
but had employed farm managers to manage the farm on their behalf. To maintain contact 
with these ‘managers’, they use cell phones hence the reference to ‘cell phone farmers’ as 
the Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe once called them. Some homesteads were 
manned by employees of respondents, while the land beneficiary stayed in the urban area 
of Bulawayo with his immediate family. These farmers would then come to the farm over 
school holidays with the land owner paying regular monthly visits depending upon the 
need or his pocket to meet travelling expenses.  
 
4.10 Housing 
Sixty three percent (n=38) of the homes were made of cheap brick moulded in the 
vicinity, with a high number, 46% (n=28) made of mud brick and corrugated iron roof. 
There were a few, 12% (n=7) old fashioned mud and dagga huts typically found in most 
of the poor rural homes in Zimbabwe. Common among the homesteads too was the log 
and pole built granaries, 44% (n=26) for storage of maize and other grains after 
harvesting. The majority, 89% (n=53) of the households indicated that they used wood 
for cooking with paraffin being regarded as too expensive. The very few, 11% (n=7) who 
managed to move into the former farmers homesteads had access to electricity and piped 
water. Interestingly these very few were army generals (n=5) still serving in the 
Zimbabwean national army and some senior security service personnel (n=2) still in the 
intelligence unit. 
 
4.11 Proximity to health services 
For the households in Umguza resettlement scheme, the nearest hospital is in Bulawayo, 
which is Mpilo hospital, a major referral centre for the surrounding districts. This is 
where they could also access a doctor or a quality health service. On the other hand, 4 
clinics in the area which were formerly farm clinics are no longer functional, leaving 8 
functional clinics. The local mobile clinics (2 satellite clinics) from the district are poorly 
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manned with limited stocks of medicines. These too are manned by nurse aides or 
auxiliaries, people from among the community. Thus for the households, it would take 
travelling to Bulawayo for major hospital referrals or serious treatment or to 
Nyamandlovu for treatments. 
 
4.12 Tenure security and perceptions on security of tenure  
As indicated overlapping claims and tenure insecurity will generate conflict in future as 
seen by the threats uttered by the 'indigenes' to those they consider not sufficiently local 
enough (refer to section 4.8 above). Moreover, the land invasions have not enhanced food 
security, nor have “invaders” been able to retain access to land. There have been cases 
where political notables evicted “land invaders” from farms in order for them to take over 
or as a ploy to later parcel out this same land to the favoured few. In addition, there have 
been cases where the first settler invader is not the original recipient of that land as the 
farm is given to somebody else. This happened from district to district with the names at 
the council offices not being the names at the resettlement scheme where the war veterans 
influenced who got what. Compounding the situation was the lack of clear-cut ownership 
and proper government policy that spelt out the lease period or gave a title deed to the 
new farm owners. Utete (2002) in his report of the Presidential land review committee on 
the implementation of the fast track land reform programme makes mention of these 
problems. 
 
 This led to the reluctance by some beneficiaries to fully invest their efforts in an 
enterprise they were unsure of, in terms of the future. Most were apprehensive that their 
ownership of farms would not last their lifetime believing that a change in government 
might bring about a reversal of fortunes. One respondent speaking on condition of 
anonymity said: 
Without any legal protection for the land that we acquired, I don’t feel 
secure. It’s worse when I consider that these white farmers had ‘big 
lawyers’ and money but they still lost the land to us. I fear an MDC 
victory might reverse all these gains we have made; hence my reluctance 
to build a big house or to invest seriously on the farm. 
 
If this trend continues, it could mean that land invasions would simply represent a 
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populist mechanism through which a change in the racial pattern of land ownership is 
effected but does not entirely address the needs of the poor as seen by the disgruntled 
non- recipients of land. 
 
4.13 Food security 
A fundamental premise of most land reform programmes is that the provision of land to 
the poor will result in greater food security. Regarding the study, a substantial portion of 
the land reform beneficiaries were engaged in food production for their own 
consumption. The interviews further revealed that upon accessing the land, beneficiaries 
were more likely than not to begin crop cultivation. Although this crop cultivation was at 
a smaller scale, it should be seen in the context of securing one’s place and also revealing 
the limited capacity of the fast track farmers to go into full scale agricultural production. 
 
In terms of non monetary benefits, the majority stated that these were food from the 
harvest. Crops planted were maize, the staple food crop with other grains, like wheat 
under irrigation and nuts like groundnuts and sweet potatoes. These beneficiaries also 
kept a few livestock ranging from two to five cattle per household on average, with a 
number of goats from five and above but not anything above fifty. These animals are kept 
mostly for milk and as a form of wealth creation while the smaller animals like goats are 
to be slaughtered on special occasions like Christmas and for those rare occasions when 
meat is essential. For food, these recipients eat what they can produce and subsidise that 
through groceries bought from the nearby city of Bulawayo.   
 
Food security in Zimbabwe began to be a serious concern during the period from 2000 to 
2001. Part of this shortfall could be attributed to vagaries of weather, especially the 
lingering impact of cyclone Elaine in 1999-2000 and the erratic rainy season of 2000-
2001.  These events resulted in two consecutive seasons of poor production in the most 
vulnerable areas of the country (UNDP 2002). Disruptions to the commercial farming 
sector caused by the fast track land reform programme have compounded the shortfalls as 
a result of cutbacks in areas planted to crops, particularly maize, during the 2000-2003 
seasons (see section 3.12.4 Agricultural production). The expectations of some officials 
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who were implementing the Fast Track programme that the settlers’ production would 
more than make up for shortfalls in production on commercial farms was overly 
optimistic. The District Development Fund (DDF) had a limited capacity to be of much 
help for the resettled farmers while the amount of land tilled by settlers was not known. 
Given that many settlers had been located on unused or even virgin land, without 
adequate implements to plough the land, there was insufficient time for them to clear and 
de-stump land for mechanized tillage. As mentioned earlier in this study, there were also 
serious concerns about the availability and distribution of farm inputs for the land 
recipients. 
  
Fast track land reform therefore has led to Zimbabwe experiencing a lot of consequences 
chief of which has been a food crisis due to the considerable shortfall in food production 
among fast track land reform beneficiaries. The former bread-basket is now dependent on 
food imports and food handouts from donors and neighbouring countries.  
 
4.14 Poverty alleviation 
When examined in the current economic context, fast track land reform in Zimbabwe has 
not seriously alleviated poverty, especially rural poverty. Despite the government’s 
touted policy of redistribution of wealth, restructuring access to land and economic 
development; poverty alleviation and food security have been failures. Several reasons 
can be put forward to explain this failure. Firstly, as alluded to in the study, fast track 
land reform did not benefit the most deserving rural landless. Instead it benefited party 
loyalists, civil servants and other elites who were not poor residents of over-crowded 
rural communities. Secondly, the few deserving land recipients were too poor to manage 
the farms enough to generate reasonable incomes for their sustenance and economic 
production like the white commercial farmers. Thirdly, the macro-economic environment 
prevailing in Zimbabwe, at the time, made it difficult even for those willing to try hard 
enough as there were no banks ready to offer loans to people without any collateral. This 
lack of tenure security contributed to the reluctance by the banks to commit finances to 
new farmers. Further, the government itself was in no financial position to provide   
assistance as shown by its failure to develop infrastructure for new farmers. 
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The violent nature of fast track land reform meant that mostly men benefited from the 
land redistribution as they stood a better chance in such power relations contest. Added to 
that, the patriarchal nature of Zimbabwean society disempowered women yet they are 
known to be among the most impoverished sector of society. In addition to this, evidence 
suggests that the major income generated by the recipients of land reform comes from 
outside their farming enterprises as suggested by the one respondent earning his living in 
neighbouring South Africa. With regards to farm workers, their plight has been worsened 
with very little having been done to improve their fate.  
 
4.15 Macro economic policy framework and environment 
As has been observed, fast track land reform occurred in the background of a dire 
economic environment in Zimbabwe which was crippling to the state and its people 
(Marinda 2006). 
 
Unemployment was at record high of 80%, made worse by the acute economic 
deterioration. Chronic shortages of basic commodities led to many people in Zimbabwe 
doing their grocery shopping in neighbouring countries especially Botswana and South 
Africa. Recurrent fuel shortages and power shortages had become the norm. An influx of 
refugees and immigrants to Zimbabwe’s neighbouring countries namely South Africa, 
Namibia, Botswana, Zambia and overseas witnessed an exodus of young people that were 
economically active. All this could be attributed to or blamed on the ruling party that 
adopted a policy of survival at all costs, as has happened with the chaotic, lawless nature 
of fast track resettlement. Once affected by the macro-economic environment, the masses 
became a restive, disenchanted population. In a convoluted way, this economic 
environment made it impossible for fast track land reform to succeed as the government 
was crippled financially too. In this situation, government could not make provisions for 
infrastructure in the resettled areas or offer state support to land reform beneficiaries. 
There was no training offered to these small scale emerging farmers unlike the first phase 
of land reform which had master farmers (Kinsey 1999).With no concrete policy 
framework to guide  fast track land reform such as determining agricultural prices, 
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encouraging food production and employment creation in rural areas, fast track land 
reform was doomed to fail (Mahuku 2005). The haphazard nature of the resettlement 
programme meant that even those efficient sectors of the white commercial farmers were 
swept away by the tidal wave of land invasions in a non discretionary manner (Moyo 
2003). 
 
4.16 The role of the state 
The role of the state in land reform has to be an active facilitatory role if it is to meet its 
objectives of equity, rural development and poverty alleviation including food security 
(Byres 2002).The Zimbabwean government failed to provide financial and infrastructural 
support to the land beneficiaries. Support such as agricultural extension services, capital, 
credit, research, training services and agricultural equipment was not provided during the 
fast track resettlement phase as revealed from the case study of Umguza. In contrast, 
international examples suggest that successful land reform programmes feature strong 
state support for land reform beneficiaries including investment in infrastructure and 
social services (Marinda 2006). But with the Zimbabwean case it was a different state of 
affairs. Planning has not been very thorough as pointed out by government officials and 
through official documents such as the Utete (2002) report. This can be attributed to the 
fact that short term institutional processes failed to inspire innovations that were 
necessary for local development initiatives at the beneficiary level. On the other hand, the 
active participation of Governors in the land allocation process, as supported by 
Matabeleland North’s Obert Mpofu’s active role, meant that the state was fully involved 
in the fast track land reform process. 
 
4.17 Beneficiary participation 
Fast track land reform in Zimbabwe resulted from the political landscape of a state 
threatened by the emergence of a powerful political rival, a restive population, militant 
war veterans and an economy that had spiralled out of control (de Villiers 2003). War 
veterans and ruling party members and elements in the state organs influenced the 
direction that fast track land reform took (Chaumba et al 2003). It is these very same 
people who benefited from resettlement as they were closer to the action and by their 
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very connections could choose the land that they wanted. Thus, there was limited 
participation by other groups outside of these sections leading to views that the process 
was discriminatory and biased. There was the parcelling of land to people not originally 
from Umguza or Matabeleland North which was not well received by the locals from the 
area. Thus, the most marginalized and poor who were most deserving of land did not 
benefit from a supposedly equitable programme meant to redress imbalances. 
 
Other countries like Tanzania had large-scale consultative campaigns and information 
dissemination efforts while Mozambique allowed more extensive beneficiary 
participation (Marinda 2006).This lack of participation by the intended beneficiaries saw 
‘chancers’ who were trying their luck accessing land. These people became known as the 
‘cell phone farmers’ therefore contributing to the failure of the programme. As has 
emerged from the profile of the beneficiaries, these were educated, mostly literate people 
with a reasonable access to resources marginalising women and the poor who could not 
successfully negotiate the power relations at play. The same goes for young people (both 
men and women) who could not benefit from resettlement as the process marginalised 
them too as suggested by the average age of the land beneficiaries referred to earlier in 
the chapter . This then shows that the demands and needs of beneficiaries were not taken 
into account in a politically expedient programme meant to assuage and protect the hold 
on power of the ruling party. Beneficiary participation was inadequate as seen by the lack 
of relevant farming skills among the beneficiaries of the fast track land reform 
programme. 
 
The failure to take cognisance of the need for fairness as an important criterion in 
beneficiary selection might result in future dispossession, increased rural polarization and 
conflict.   
 
4.18 Impoverishment of communities 
Bringing about land reform however, does not necessarily translate into sustainable gains 
for the rural poor. In Zimbabwe, for example, a significant number of farm labourers 
have been displaced as indicated by one of the respondents quoted in the study. 
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“One wrong cannot be made right by another wrong. It is wrong to grab farms from 
whites who provided employment for some of us in their farms. Now we are left with no 
source of income. What do we do at our old age?”   
 
Further, although the invasions were partly orchestrated, it was nevertheless a chaotic and 
unplanned resettlement process. It is very likely that resettled communities /individuals 
will not have access to sufficient state support to succeed (see the comments from a 
respondent above which supports this). One aspect that emerged from the interviews 
especially with certain officials and non beneficiaries of land was the issue of 
impoverishment of land reform beneficiaries. Fast track redistribution had become an 
expensive exercise which had done little to improve the lot of some beneficiaries’ lives. 
The frequent travelling from their urban homes in Bulawayo, paying of salaries and the 
upkeep of employees or relatives who were left to guard the farms meant that recipients 
had to dig deep into their own pockets. The absence of post settlement support for 
agricultural production affected any farming enterprise that these people might have 
hoped to undertake. As the case study shows, some had left the resettlement scheme to 
seek a more viable livelihood opportunity in South Africa as explained by one of the land 
beneficiaries. 
I took the land as an opportunity but with the worsening economic 
environment, I have had to rethink things. I am currently earning a living 
in South Africa and have left farming for now. When things become 
better in time, I will go back and hopefully earn a living through 
farming.  
 
When the issue of housing is taken into consideration, the mud hut structures were a 
lowering of standards as most of these recipients were urban dwellers renting council 
owned houses with some even having built their own houses in town. Some of these 
people's dependence on remittances from their children also does reveal their dependent 
status showing that they were no better off than they had been in the beginning.  
 
For the greater part, most of the respondents felt that it was imperative that government 
provide significant state support and investment for them to survive. The majority 
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expressed dismay at the lack of adequate support services with the blame being cast on 
some government institutions such as GMB and ARDA. There were also reservations on 
private sector support and NGO support with unease on the role these institutions should 
play in supporting the new farmers. It was felt that some of these institutions would not 
support a government led land reform as most had previously argued for the respect of 
property rights. On the other hand, rural livelihoods had been improved through NGO 
support for example ORAP and WFP who ran food distribution programmes in 
communal areas and thus some felt it was important to engage with the sector to improve 
and impact fast track land reform for it to succeed.  
 
4.19 Insights from other studies on fast track land reform 
This section provides insights from studies undertaken on fast track land reform. Despite 
its touted agenda to ‘contest the monopolistic privileges of white or corporate farming’ 
and ‘to create conditions for more diverse forms of commodity production’ (Cousins 
2004:12) the programme cannot be seen as having addressed the ‘agrarian question of the 
dispossessed’ (Cousins 2004:12) though it claims to have done so. Contrary to the 
original objective of ‘one man one farm’, those with political clout and well connected to 
the ruling elite took full advantage to acquire more than one farm. This happened through 
an increasing tendency for self-settlement including multiple land ownership (Utete 
2002). When linked to the initial limited government control over the whole process, 
perceptions built up over time to view the programme as chaotic, haphazard, technically 
deficient and politically motivated with predictions made that it was bound to fail 
(Habakkuk 2005, Moyo 2003). This is because the constituting of a ‘new class’ of 
emergent petty commodity producers from within the ranks of the desperately poor 
(Cousins 2004) did not become a reality as shown by multiple ownership of farms by a 
select few. With Zimbabwe’s fast track land resettlement, there were allegations of 
cronyism and general corruption levelled against the land allocation process. The 
overriding perception or feeling was that the programme was a means of rewarding the 
party faithful and civil servants for their support of the ruling party (Chaumba et al 2003). 
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Cousins (2004:14) observation in his statement that: 
“International experience shows that elites tend to capture the benefits of land reform 
unless there are decisive shifts in power relations and a redistribution of political and 
economic power in favour of the poor.” 
 
The above lends weight to the assertion of reward politics or the politics of patronage. In 
the same vein, the ZANU PF government has been perceived to be using land reform as a 
means of shoring up power in the face of an opposition that was becoming a real threat 
(Chaumba et al 2003). The loss of the February 2000 referendum about a new 
constitution marked the ushering in of the chaotic and violent land reform. As events in 
Zimbabwe clearly demonstrate, changes in the balance of political forces can 
dramatically alter the terrain of land reform policy. In addition, collective interests are not 
simply givens but have to be constituted by ‘political leadership and political choice’ 
(Bernstein in Cousins 2004:16). Lahiff and Cousins (2001:653) also validate this when 
they state that the violent and chaotic land seizures ‘were supported if not initiated by an 
embattled and corrupt political regime’. A political leadership and choice that is always 
meant to serve the needs and interests while also maintaining the dominion of the ruling 
elite. 
 
Despite the explosive politics of fast track land reform, it had its supporters. The war 
veterans basing on the data or evidence presented already would be chief among its 
proponents. For some people in Zimbabwe, there was evident appreciation of the 
opportunities availed to them by fast track land reform including future prospects 
(Chaumba et al 2003). For these people, their main argument was that fast track land 
reform had been long over due as a process and they had waited for this to happen a very 
long time. As asserted in the Utete (2002) report, representatives of farmer’s unions (the 
black farmers), the financial services sector and agro-business generally perceived land 
reform as vital for the country’s political stability and economic development. However, 
they insisted on agriculture being placed on a properly planned and adequately resourced 
basis. This was not a far-fetched, ungrounded fear on their part, but a legitimate concern 
as demonstrated by the beneficiaries themselves who pointed to a general lack of 
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adequate service delivery by all government departments due to limited financial 
resources. Consequently, this impacted negatively on technical extension support services 
and provision of infrastructure (Marimira 2006). In such a state of affairs, even those 
respondents supporting fast track land reform would view the land reform in a negative or 
disapproving light. 
A study of Goromonzi District in Zimbabwe done by Marimira revealed the following: 
 
1) Due to accusations of corruption levelled against the local land committee, some 
informants complained that they could not access inputs. 
2) The majority of informants reported that settlers on farms originate from far away 
places which could explain the formation of social clubs to meet their needs.  
3) 75% of respondents reported that settlers were not overly keen to come together 
for communal projects; a limited social coherence factor that could be explained 
by their origins being mostly from the urban areas. 
4) A huge majority of settlers in one area (Dunstan) perceive the new settlement just 
as a place/home for retirement as opposed to a commercial agricultural enterprise. 
5) Overall, informants were unhappy at all with the level of interaction between land 
recipients and the government. As an example, more than seventy percent of the 
respondents were of the opinion that with the exception of the GMB, most 
government departments had not fulfilled their mandates. There was no 
consultation in decision making and implementation. The majority, sixty percent 
of the respondents were of the impression that officials had no knowledge about 
their problems because of the information gap between them and the government, 
Marimira (2006 :26)  
 
Most of the sentiments expressed above can be found in the responses given by the 
respondents to the UMguza study. 
 
The Utete (2002) report stated that beneficiaries generally expressed overall approval 
with the outcome of the programme implementation and the manner in which 
beneficiaries own lives were becoming transformed, dramatically in some cases. 
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Contrasted to this, unhappiness with fast track land reform was noted among those that 
were still awaiting resettlement when promises of land allocation by their local leaders 
failed to materialise. At the same time, some former white commercial farmers felt 
aggrieved and unfairly discriminated against as they were in compliance with the criteria 
set by government in the Land Acquisition Act, that of ‘one man, one farm’ policy, for 
retaining their land, yet had their farms being appropriated (Utete 2002). This implied 
that commercial farmers had no tenure security under fast track land reform as land could 
be taken away from them even if they complied with the terms of the ‘one man, one 
farm’ policy. 
 
If the  white commercial farmers could lose their land so easily despite their title deeds, 
what then for the resettled farmers who had no title deeds and acquired their land in an 
environment of uncertainty, fear, loathing and a great deal of mayhem. Despite the 
legitimisation of the land occupations by the Rural Land Occupiers Act, freehold title for 
rural land in Zimbabwe had become an insecure form of land tenure (Marongwe 2003). 
Remarkably, even among the resettled farmers themselves, the perception existed that 
they were only temporary, leading to the building of pole and dagga huts showing the 
presumed temporary nature of their stay (Chaumba et al 2003). Official documents also 
indicate this same trend of uncertainty and being unsure as reported by the Utete (2003) 
Commission which alluded to multiple farm ownership by certain individuals, low uptake 
by others, certain perceived shortcomings and disappointments with the A2 model as 
there were no immediate benefits. The study therefore sought to investigate and 
document what the perceptions of fast track land reform around Umguza would be in the 
light of the findings elsewhere. 
 
4.18 Conclusion  
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that fast track land reform has been plagued 
with problems. From its failure to produce a regulated, standard process to the haphazard 
nature of land allocation, this does not bode well for its success. It even failed to comply 
with the basic ingredient of success, which is equipping and ‘skilling’ those taking over 
from white commercial farmers.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This study has explored why fast track land reform became necessary in Zimbabwe. It 
has documented how this reform was undertaken and in what conditions it occurred. This 
thesis has examined the relationship between fast track resettlement, livelihoods and 
socio-political factors. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to highlight those 
critical issues that underlie this relationship and provide a framework of how they could 
be analyzed. In this chapter, key issues relating to rural livelihood systems and their 
dependence on socio-political and economic factors are revisited and examined within 
local, national and global contexts. In this context, the chapter first provides a summary 
of the key findings of the thesis, before providing some recommendations which could be 
adopted around the land reform programme. The last part of the thesis then provides 
overall conclusions to the study as a whole. An examination is done regarding what can 
influence future land reform programmes in relation to sustainability within the context 
of agricultural production, restructuring of access and ownership of land. 
 
5.1 Summary 
The chapter is based on the key arguments that were presented in the study.  First, the 
study argues that there is an ideological way of analysing the fast track resettlement of 
people in Zimbabwe. The argument holds that the land reform programme was based 
loosely on neo-populism which was a movement away from the earlier period of neo-
liberalism (market based system) that had been adopted during the time of Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme. Certain cross-cutting issues act as common reference 
pointing to this shift in policy. In brief these could be viewed as the macro economic 
environment of hyper inflation, an increasingly frustrated population, high 
unemployment, an increasingly radical group of war veterans and a growing opposition 
to the ruling party. Such a state of affairs did not necessarily lead to revolution and an 
uprising, but instead it provided mechanisms for unlocking the grip on power of the 
ruling party. Fast track land reform then became an essential tool for maintaining and 
keeping that grip on power. 
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The purpose of this research was to address the questions raised in chapter one, about the 
history of fast track in Umguza, how land reform has shaped the livelihoods of 
stakeholders and their perceptions. Challenges, opportunities and constraints to rural 
development were also addressed. As shown in chapter two, debate still lingers on 
whether the ‘agrarian question of the dispossessed’ has been answered by fast track 
resettlement. Chapter three dealt with the methodology applied and their justification. It 
briefly introduced the case study area with a description of the settlers together with the 
profile of the district. Data analysis is dealt with here and a section is dedicated to 
revealing the challenges that were faced while undertaking this research. Chapter four 
discusses the research findings contextualizing them at the macro-level. This study shows 
that land redistribution is a controversial process whose intricacies may not be wholly 
understood through just focusing on production issues but also through realizing that 
there are a host of other factors that need to be considered. It ends with a brief look at 
insights from other studies on fast track land reform as they relate to the points raised in 
the study. In this last chapter (chapter five) consolidation and discussion of the findings 
will be done together with the recommendations for future land reform programmes. 
 
This study shows that all land reform beneficiaries in Umguza rely on income outside of 
farming in their daily struggle to eke a living. The livelihoods of many land reform 
beneficiaries in Umguza resettlement scheme and residents of the surrounding communal 
areas abutting this scheme are dependent on other resources besides those that are found 
in the scheme. In some cases, survival strategies have enabled some households to cope 
with common stresses and shocks such as drought while in other cases some households 
have even used these resources as a basis for diversifying their livelihoods. When 
subjected to the onslaught of multiple stresses and shocks, vulnerable poor households in 
Umguza incorporate survival strategies in their strategies for coping with inadvertent risk. 
This confirms that correlations between the socio-political and economic relations play 
an important role in agricultural development (Kinsey 1999). 
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However, extreme and extraordinary stresses create constraints that undermine the 
relationship between people and the state, and in the process subdue livelihood 
sustainability. This is especially the case with shocks such as severe droughts (2000-
2001) and the multiple stressors associated with Zimbabwe’s worsening macro-economic 
environment. Livelihoods are sustainable when they are resilient and capable of being 
maintained or even enhanced without undermining the natural resource base (Chambers 
and Conway, 1992). In this context, a key issue that emerges from this research is that the 
complex relationship that evolves between resettlement and natural capital entails the 
need to employ an integrated approach for us to fully understand it. 
 
Every political scientist and practicing policy maker knows that simply passing a law 
does not ensure the desired legislative goal (Williams et el 1995). Rather implementation 
is an arduous task which can be facilitated by a variety of factors such as adequate 
resources, vigilant oversight, and cooperation from all stakeholders, who comprise 
farmers, government, landless, academics, non governmental organizations and funders 
(Moyo 2003). The external forces for change, in this case the legislative mandate and 
stakeholders’ participation play an important role although leadership within the country 
is very important in responding to those forces (Marinda 2006). In addition, a certain 
level of balance needs to be established with both a strong private sector and an equally 
strong public sector with a strong civil society acting as a countervailing force between 
these two (Marinda 2006). With such a scenario, the state can be prevented from dictating 
the terms of land reform and the same goes for powerful and wealthy land owners 
holding the state to ransom. This has the potential of stopping private (free 
enterprise/market economy) rather than state ownership (subversive socialism) and vice 
versa (Chambers and Conway1992, Marinda 2006, de Villiers 2003) creating a 
reasonable balance.  
 
Countries in which the legislature provided additional resources as incentives and in 
which farmers saw the mandates meet their own  preferences had serious implementation 
efforts underway, a situation predicted by political economy literature (Adams 2001, 
Marinda 2006). Clear legislative goals, objectives and good consultation process were 
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important implementation activities. Continuous monitoring and adaptation/flexibility as 
in the South African model have proven to be very important in implementation and 
establishing a successful model (Mahuku 2005). 
 
In conclusion, one can quote the words of Carl Jung in Marinda (2006) who said: 
‘The foremost of all illusions is that anything can ever satisfy anybody. That illusion 
stands behind all that is unendurable in life and in front of all progress, and it is one of the 
most difficult things to overcome…’ 
 
The above quote aptly sums the feelings of people where land reform is concerned as it 
seems to be never enough to satisfy almost everybody without leaving one group 
disaffected by the experience. Usually there is one group that gains from the status quo 
while the other feels left out with solutions generated becoming the dominant cause of the 
consequences with which public policy must contend. For example, as seen from the 
effects of fast track land reform, an issue like the case of ex-farm workers becomes a 
sticking point. The issues of food security, security of tenure and technical support 
become other resultant effects which public policy has to contend with.  Hence the 
problems found with most reforms implemented. In the end, there is a group of people 
left out who feel that they have been overlooked as the study has revealed. The storyline 
that emerged from the data laid bare the fact that the quality of life of beneficiaries had 
not significantly changed in ways that could lead to their classification as emerging black 
commercial farmers. This is despite all the rhetoric that has been placed in the public 
domain by politicians and government people toeing the ruling party line. As for most of 
the fast track land reform beneficiaries, a good number were still farming at subsistence 
level. 
 
5.2 Land and the politics of patronage 
The elitism and cronyism of earlier land reform together with the chaos of fast track land 
reform call for an early redistribution that also takes cognisance of production factors and 
capacity. The Zimbabwean government was unable to improve the lives of ordinary 
people. Beneficiaries of fast track were avowed party loyalists and war veterans ahead of 
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the land hungry peasants. There was no serious commitment to land redistribution as 
shown by the lack of support structures, administration staff, budgeting and planning for 
resources. Therefore, this was a land reform programme that was not transparent and 
neither did it adhere to good political and economic governance principles and policies.   
 
Not all individuals have equal access to all production options. Therefore agricultural and 
animal husbandry possibilities are mediated by structures of social difference and power 
relations as well as economic, demographic and ecological parameters. The opportunities 
and constraints for differing farming strategies or the perceived opportunities and 
constraints, depend on farmers’ wealth, gender, age, class and ethnicity (Scoones 2002). 
Scoones and Woolmer (2002:26) also observe that ‘in Zimbabwe, gender differences are 
important with women’s strategies for managing small livestock as part of both an 
individual and household farming enterprise often underestimated’. A point that has been 
proven by the study which shows that women land owners had very little assets including 
livestock and thus stood at a disadvantage in terms of farming and being productive in 
their agricultural enterprise. It is because of these power relations that women and young 
people are in the minority as beneficiaries, a state of affairs that does not bode well for 
poverty alleviation and rural development.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
Zimbabwe needs to embark on a rule-governed land reform which has recognition from 
all the citizens and the international community to gain legitimacy. This will attract 
foreign investment leading to a build up in employment removing the void of 
disenchanted citizens who could boil over and destabilise the government. This leads to 
one of the recommendations suggested in this thesis, notably that in order to be 
successful, a land reform programme requires effective policies and relatively speedy 
implementation within a context of general economic development, and with particular 
emphasis on employment creation 
 
Secondly a new constitution needs to be enacted that serves as a self-restraining 
mechanism for good governance both economically and politically. This will guard 
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against the misuses of donor funds meant for land reform being channelled to other areas 
as happened in the past (Marinda 2006). This goes hand in hand with adhering to the rule 
of law and earning political legitimacy which Zimbabwe badly needs. 
 
Thirdly a sweeping review needs to be undertaken of the fast track land reform to 
rationalize the chaos obtaining around resettled farmers A first step would be an honest, 
transparent process identifying who received what land and how much each individual 
got. After this period of reconciliation and going back to the drawing board, the policy of 
‘one person, one farm’ for all should be diligently enforced without regard to the race of 
the individual or their political connections. 
 
Fourthly, repossession and appropriation of land from the black farmers who have failed 
to be productive on the farms should be considered. In the same vein, creation of an 
enabling environment for the return of white commercial farmers, those who had been 
productive before the fast track land invasions, to some of these repossessed farms. 
Where possible, the government has to create an enabling environment allowing for 
cooperation and working together between white commercial farmers and their black 
counterparts. Those farmers who had established working relationships with the invaders 
could be encouraged to have a negotiated system that works for and benefits both parties. 
This could be touted as a model of reconciliation and unity between black and white in 
the country that could push agricultural development another notch. The advantages are 
obvious as experience and money is paired with the previously disadvantaged and 
marginalised instead of just dropping the black farmers into the deep end with no 
resources. 
 
The fifth recommendation recognises that government needs to commit to land reform 
that is fair, equitable and not as cumbersome. This should be done by creating a relevant 
ministry or department specifically to deal with land reform as a matter of priority and 
urgency. This ministry or department would be run by qualified personnel in land issues 
with the necessary support of civil society and research institutions including universities. 
By having one dedicated ministry, it would cut down on government bureaucracy 
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allowing for a speedy implementation of the land reform programme. 
 
A land tax could be introduced and enforced to help gather funds for land redistribution. 
This would be a home-grown tool for social transformation operational within the 
country’s legal framework. By establishing a land tax, unproductive farmers and 
speculators would be weeded out of agriculture although the state has to be careful that it 
does not sweep away new and emerging farmers (Lahiff 2003). 
 
Another recommendation is that the country needs to hold a national land conference 
with all stakeholders being invited to make a contribution to chart the way forward for 
Zimbabwe’s land reform. This should include civil society, commercial farmers both 
black and white, external donors and representatives of the local population who are not 
members of traditional authority and non governmental organisations. Mass mobilisation 
should be encouraged together with the development of rural organisations that support 
rights and livelihoods education. An example of Bangladesh could be followed (Marinda 
2006). Government needs to be more accommodative and desist from the politics of 
exclusion and patronage where party loyalty is rewarded with farms even if it affects 
agricultural production. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 “The history of land reform around the world demonstrates that land invasions, which 
the government then normalises through legal processes of expropriation and allocation, 
have been the most common and effective process of land reform”. Professor Johann Van 
Zyl in Marinda 2006) 
 
The quotation above if it is to be believed suggests that direct action (including violent 
actions) can influence governments and landowners to embark on land reform 
programmes. An easier solution, as it simply legitimates the invasions allowing for 
redistributing the land in question to the occupiers. In this regard, an important aspect of 
land reform that is often overlooked in policy analysis is highlighted. This is the fact that 
spontaneous settlement or land invasions are sometimes more successful with regard to 
the amount of land redistributed and the numbers resettled when compared to the amount 
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of land redistributed through official land reform programmes. If the figures quoted by 
the government are to be believed, then this stands the test when compared to the earlier 
figures achieved during the first and second phases of land reform in Zimbabwe.  
 
World Bank sponsored researchers and representatives have made similar observations 
and have argued that, in some cases, the logical approach to land reform would be “to 
design programmes that provide regularisation of agricultural and selected 
infrastructure services to spontaneous settlers” (Marinda 2006). A notable case is that of 
Zimbabwe in the early years during independence as has been indicated in the thesis. It 
has to be mentioned that there are advantages to spontaneous settlement or land 
invasions, as compared to planned land reform programmes. Spontaneous settlements can 
avoid some of the common problems associated with administered land reform. For 
example, the bureaucratic hassles of negotiating several ministries are done away with 
while the cumbersome process of 'willing buyer, willing seller' does not occur and the 
invaded land is prime land, not the marginal lands that was put on offer by the 
commercial farmers as a token of appeasing government.  
 
As Gass and Sumberg (1993:5) point out: 
 Alternative pathways are particularly and will likely become 
increasingly important for women and other marginalized groups who 
generally have limited access to high quality and other productive 
resources. For these people, the intensification of livestock production 
outside the mixed farming model may be a critical element of a viable 
livelihood strategy.  
 
The socially embedded nature of land as a resource makes for contestations and power 
struggles which lead to women and other marginalised groups aligning themselves with 
the powerful in order to protect their sustenance and livelihoods.  
Women’s land claims seem to have a chance of becoming effective only 
if they have some male support. Hence rather than aligning with other 
women, those serious with their claims seek to build alliances with men, 
particularly those able to influence the argument in their favour. Because 
women’s land claims are a gender issue, women are unwilling to 
mobilise around this issue, but there is also an enhanced resistance from 
men (Nitya 2005:18).  
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This strategy of building alliances has proven true and useful in fast track land reform. 
This has seen women aligning themselves with base commanders and influential officials 
in the super seven committees and district officials, a means of acquiring male labour and 
networks (Chaumba et al 2003). This too serves to protect their interests in a male 
dominated potentially violent and explosive environment of fast track resettlement where 
showing any weakness can lead to loss of that land.  
 
As a preliminary conclusion, the farm invasions suggest that there is a close relationship 
between direct action and land reform. Indications that emerged from the Zimbabwean 
situation indicate that, in some cases, land invasions are legitimated by the state and thus 
form an important part of overall land reform. Generally, for the spontaneous settlements 
to influence the outcomes of land reform, they should not have any political influence or 
motivation. The political elements in the fast track land reform programme in Zimbabwe 
have shown that political interference cannot yield the desired outcomes. 
  
In a final analysis, it appears that neither state–led market reform, nor market based land 
reform will be successful unless the potential beneficiaries, particularly the most 
marginalized, have played an active role in policy development and implementation. It 
can be argued that success of a land reform programme depends to a large extent on the 
participation of the marginalized, dispossessed individuals and communities (Marinda 
2006). Based on the findings in this research, one can say the same holds true for 
redistributive reforms in the form of fast track land reform programme. As has been 
proven by the statistics with regards to ownership of land, women and young people were 
marginalised in the process of land allocation together with former farm workers. In the 
same vein, a similar observation could be made for people originally from Matabeleland 
North who felt discriminated against from a process that happened in their backyards and 
yet they were not beneficiaries of that resettlement. 
 
Finally, policies and programmes that do not take differentiation and local context into 
account will be inappropriate. For example, giving large tracts of land to people who do 
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not belong in that particular area or locality defeats the whole purpose of reducing 
communal congestion which was the proclaimed aim of land reform (Utete 2002). In this 
way, redistribution will probably not succeed as there will be bound to be clamours for 
land from those who feel they have been deprived of their inheritance in land. Therefore, 
tenure policies that fail to take into consideration political and economic differentiation 
may result in dispossession, increasing rural polarisation and conflict. 
 
 Moreover, tenure reform programmes that do not take account of the differentiated 
nature of land rights like the issue of secondary rights for women in particular, as well as 
conditions of landlessness for ex-farm workers for example, will provide tenure security 
only to elites and the powerful. Furthermore, policy developers and implementers should 
be discriminating when it comes to people driven reform like (fast track was claimed to 
be) because community driven programmes are quite possibly the perspective of the 
powerful or influential members of that community. For example, because individuals are 
members of particular social systems and operate within the confines of the relations of 
power within that system, therefore Zanu PF (as the ruling party) together with the war 
veterans managed to manipulate and determine due process within the reform 
programme. The failure to take this socio-political differentiation into account is one of 
the major causes for the exclusion of large groups for example, former farm-workers and 
those believed to be members of the opposition by those who had moved 
opportunistically, mostly war veterans and party loyalists. 
 
The most striking example is the utter failure of the overall land reform programme, as 
well as its constituent parts and related aspects, to benefit women and young people. This 
failure is the result of policies and procedures that did not take account of the fact that 
young people and women’s position in society is fundamentally weakened. This 
weakened position is influenced by the unequal division of labour, institutional violence, 
patriarchal patterns of land allocation and inheritance, cultural restrictions, lack of 
educational and training opportunities in rural areas. 
 
This thesis evaluated fast track land reform in Zimbabwe basing on case study research of 
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Umguza. The factors examined include issues of ‘equity’ restructuring of access, security 
of tenure, food security, poverty alleviation and the sustainability of this phase of the land 
reform programme. To make the evaluation, the mini thesis draws on perceptions of 
people in and around Umguza resettlement scheme. The conclusion from this study is 
that none of the factors examined have been fulfilled as expected under the fast track land 
reform programme. The moral argument for facilitating the fast track land reform 
programme as presented in chapter one has similarly not been met.  
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APPENDIX I: STRUCTURED QUESTIONS THAT GUIDED THE STUDY 
 
A. Beneficiaries questions 
Demographic data 
 
1. Name of farm beneficiary. 
 Gender: male or female? 
 Age? 
 Ethnicity: Shona, Ndebele, Kalanga or other? Please specify. 
Where do you originally come from? Umguza/Nyamandlovu or other e.g. Matabeleland 
North, Matabeleland South, Midlands, Mashonaland or Manicaland? 
What is your level of education? Do you have any training in farming or some experience 
in agricultural enterprise?  
What is your occupation? 
How many people are in your household? 
 
2. Assets base 
Size of plot 
Size of land cleared/cultivated 
 What kind of crops are you growing? 
Name all the farming equipment that you own? 
What and how many animals do you have on the land? 
How long have you been residing on the land? 
What inputs do you buy? Fertilizer, seeds, insecticides? Any other not mentioned? 
Do you have any other source of income besides your farm output? Yes or no? 
If yes, what is this source of income? Does it constitute additional or it is the only means 
of livelihood? 
 
2. b. Land use pattern- is it subsistence or commercial? 
 
3.  Perception on selection process 
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How did you acquire your land? Did you formally apply for it or did you get it through 
some other means? Please specify. 
Why do you think you were resettled? How do you justify being on the list of land 
recipients? 
Were you the first to be offered land or was there someone offered before you? 
Do you belong to any organization whether political or otherwise? 
 If so do you hold a leadership position in any structure of the organization? 
 
4. Support services 
a) Do you receive any kind of support whether it is technical, monetary, political and 
social or extension support? Yes/No 
Perceptions on support services 
b) What do you think about these services?  
c) If they conflict, where is the conflict? The issue of power relations. 
d) In your assessment, are there some important services that are at the moment not 
being provided by government or NGOs in your area? If yes which are these? 
e)  In your assessment, is government doing enough to support land beneficiaries? 
Yes/No 
f) If No, why do you say so? 
 
 
5. Perceptions on land allocation in Umguza 
Is the farm size adequate for you? 
In your opinion, are there enough/ not enough farms or plots of land for all the people in 
your community who need land for farming? 
In your view, was the method of identifying and selecting land recipients satisfactory? 
Yes/No. 
If No why do you say so? 
On fast track land resettlement in Umguza, to what extent have you benefited? 
a) As an individual? 
b) As a community?   
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6. Perception/views on fast track land reform 
In your view what should be done to improve fast-track land reform? 
What do you think are the drawbacks of fast track land reform?  
If you were involved in writing the fast track land reform policy, what priorities would 
you consider? 
a) As a person? 
b) As a community member? 
 
7. Security of tenure 
Do you think your rights to land ownership are protected/safeguarded?  
What rights do you as beneficiaries have on the land? Can you freely transact in the land?  
Can your land be inherited by your children after you die? 
 Do you as a beneficiary feel that you have enforceable and substantive rights to your plot 
of land? 
 
8. Livelihood perception/ quality of life 
Has there been an improvement in your household income because of your new status as 
a resettled farmer? 
Do you feel you now have better food security than you had before resettlement? Yes/no? 
Has your quality of life improved after fast track land reform? 
How far is your home from the following facilities? 
Facility Kilometres Name 
Nearest health centre/Clinic   
Nearest water point   
Nearest Bank/POSB   
Nearest Primary School   
Nearest Secondary School   
Nearest Market  
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Nearest Agricultural 
centre/Extension support 
 
  
 
Has fast track created any economic opportunities for you? 
 
9. Conclusion 
Do you have any other comments or examples to give to add to what you have already 
said? Yes/No 
If yes, please kindly make your contribution. Any comments you make are valid and 
important. 
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B. Non Beneficiaries 
Demographic data 
 
1. Name of respondent. 
 Gender: male or female? 
 Age? 
 Ethnicity: Shona, Ndebele, Kalanga or other? Please specify. 
Where do you originally come from? Umguza/Nyamandlovu or other e.g. Matabeleland 
North, Matabeleland South, Midlands, Mashonaland or Manicaland? 
What is your level of education? 
What is your occupation? 
How many people are in your household? 
 
2. Assets base 
What kind of crops are you growing? 
Name all the farming equipment that you own? 
What and how many animals do you have on the land? 
Do you have any other source of income besides your farm output? Yes or no? 
If yes, what is this source of income? Does it constitute additional or it is the only means 
of livelihood? 
 
2. b. Land use pattern- is it subsistence or commercial? 
  
3. Selection process 
 Did you formally apply for land resettlement? Please specify. 
When did you apply for the land? 
 Do you have any historical claim to the land in Umguza? 
 Why do you think you were not chosen to be resettled? 
 How do you justify being/not being on the list of land recipients? 
Do you have any training in farming or some experience in agricultural enterprise?  
Were you the first to apply for land or were there others before you? 
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Do you belong to any organization whether political or otherwise? 
 If so do you hold a leadership position in any structure of the organization? 
 
6. Support services 
j) Do you receive any kind of support whether it is technical, monetary, political and 
social or extension support? Yes/No 
k) If yes, is this support formal or informal?   
l) What do you think about these services?  
m) If they conflict, where is the conflict? The issue of power relations. 
n) In your assessment, are there some important services that are at the moment not 
being provided by government or NGOs in your area? If yes which are these? 
o)  If No, why do you say so? 
 
7. Perception/views on land allocation in Umguza 
In your opinion, are there enough/ not enough farms or plots of land for all the people in 
your community who need land for farming? 
What is your view with regards to land allocation to people from different provinces 
outside of Matabeleland North? 
In your view, was the method of identifying and selecting land recipients satisfactory? 
Yes/No? 
If No why do you say so? 
 
6. Perception/views on fast track land reform 
In your view what should be done to improve fast-track land reform? 
What do you think are the drawbacks of fast track land reform?  
In your opinion was the Zimbabwean government justified in forcefully grabbing land or 
not from white farmers to redistribute it? 
Is there any other that is not mentioned in the above list? Please specify.  
 
7. Security of tenure 
Should the government encourage or not encourage further land grabs?  
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8. Livelihood perception/ quality of life 
Has your quality of life improved after fast track land reform? 
Has fast track created any economic opportunities for you? 
 
9. Conclusion 
Do you have any other comments or examples to give to add to what you have already 
said? Yes/No 
If yes, please kindly make your contribution. Any comments you make are valid and 
important. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
